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Abstract 
 
A judicial determination of fair value in a private company can 
be a difficult and imprecise process.  This difficulty coupled with 
variations in way mergers are negotiated and structured and the 
potential for conflicts of interest lend uncertainty to appraisal 
proceedings.  As a result, corporate participants have powerful reasons 
to seek to limit the uncertainty associated with an appraisal proceeding 
ex ante.  The response has been the growing use of shareholder 
agreements that limit appraisal rights.    
Appraisal waivers also offer a potentially attractive solution to a 
somewhat different concern, the growth of appraisal litigation in 
publicly traded companies.  As with private companies, public 
companies face the problem that appraisal proceedings involve 
substantial cost and uncertainty. Although courts and commentators 
have grappled with how best to calculate fair value and the impact of 
that methodology on the incentives of participants in the merger process, 
they have failed to reach consensus.  Appraisal waivers provide an 
alternative approach - a market-based mechanism to determine the 
efficient level of merger litigation. 
Public companies have not followed the lead of private 
companies, however, in using appraisal waivers.  As this Article 
explains, the likely reason is the impracticality of using shareholder 
agreements in public companies and a concern that appraisal waivers in 
a charter or bylaw would be invalid.     
 
*  Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  I presented preliminary versions of this paper at the 2019 BYU Winter Deals 
Conference, the PE/VC Subcommittee of the 2019 ABA Business Law Section Annual 
Meeting, and the 2019 Corporate and Securities Litigation Workshop at Boston 
University and I received many helpful comments at each.  I am also grateful for 
thoughtful comments by Brian Broughman, Larry Hamermesh, Peter Molk, and Eric 
Talley. Kevin Hayne provided excellent research assistance. 
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This Article considers both the normative and legal case for 
appraisal waivers. It argues that, with appropriate procedural 
protections – specifically the requirement that such waivers take the 
form of charter provisions -- appraisal waivers are normatively 
desirable.  It then questions whether distinguishing between the use of 
appraisal waivers in private and public companies is appropriate and 
argues that it is not.  The source of this distinction is a potential 
difference in the scope of private ordering available through shareholder 
agreements as opposed to the charter or bylaws, a difference that this 
Article critiques.   
The Article concludes that, under current law, the legal status of 
appraisal waivers is unclear.  Given the potential value that such 
waivers provide, and the particular value that market discipline would 
bring to the scope and structure of such waivers, the Article argues for 
legislation validating a corporation’s authority to limit or eliminate 
appraisal rights in its charter.   
  
Introduction 
 
Appraisal proceedings present some of the most difficult issues in 
corporate litigation.  The circumstances under which shareholders have 
the right to be cashed out at fair value and the appropriate methodology 
for determining fair value have been the subject of extensive judicial and 
academic commentary1 and have generated repeated legislative efforts to 
refine the scope of the statutory remedy.2  Despite this attention, 
appraisal law remains uncertain, creating the potential for costly and 
burdensome litigation.3 
 
1 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Appraisal litigation after Aruba? It’s still a bad bet for 
shareholders, REUTERS, Apr. 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-
appraisal/appraisal-litigation-after-aruba-its-still-a-bad-bet-for-shareholders-
idUSKCN1RT2N4 (describing most Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Verition 
Partners v. Aruba Networks as “extraordinary”).  
2 See, e.g., Stanley Onyeador, The Chancery Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbitrageurs 
Expose Need to Further Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70 VAND. L. REV. 339, 
354-59 (2017) (describing 2016 amendments to Delaware appraisal statute and 
additional amendment proposals and advocating more extensive legislative reform). 
3 See, e.g., Matthew Evans Miehl, Note, The Cost of Appraisal Rights: How to Restore 
Certainty in Delaware Mergers, 52 GA. L. REV. 651, 673 (2018) .(describing the 
“systemic uncertainty that corporate buyers in Delaware face” due to appraisal risk);  
Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy., 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 830 
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Participants in private corporations have sought to address this 
uncertainty through contractual provisions that limit or eliminate the 
exercise of appraisal rights.4  These provisions, which include drag-along 
rights, fair price provisions and explicit appraisal waivers, are examples 
of private ordering -- efforts by corporations and their participants to 
tailor their governance rules and structures to their particularized needs.5 
Courts have widely upheld firm-specific private ordering, reasoning that 
it is consistent with a contractual approach to corporate law.6  
Commentators too generally support private ordering as producing 
efficient firm-specific rules as well as facilitating valuable 
experimentation and innovation in corporate governance.7 
The Delaware Chancery Court recently considered an issue of 
first impression – the enforceability of provision waiving the appraisal 
rights of common shareholders in a privately-held corporation.  In Manti 
Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., the court held that a 
shareholder agreement waiving appraisal rights was enforceable and did 
not violate public policy, at least on the facts of the case at bar in which 
the waiver was clear and unambiguous, the parties were sophisticated, 
advised by counsel, and waived their appraisal rights in exchange for 
consideration.8  The Manti decision is important for the support it 
 
(1984) (citing “the highly unpredictable standards for valuation, which make it difficult 
for either side in an appraisal proceeding to predict the outcome of the proceeding 
accurately”).   
4 See, e.g., Sean Babar, The Enforceability of Appraisal Rights Waivers, FORD. J. OF 
CORP. & FIN. L. BLOG, Mar. 31, 2019. 
https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2019/03/31/the-enforceability-of-appraisal-rights-
waivers/  (describing use of appraisal waivers by private equity and venture capital 
companies). 
5 See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2015) (defining private ordering as “the adoption of 
issuer-specific rules that are contractual in nature (as opposed to statutes, agency rules, 
or decisional law)”). 
6 See Jill E. Fisch, Private Ordering and the Role of Shareholder Agreements 
(forthcoming 2021) (describing judicial receptivity to firm-specific private ordering). 
7 See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering 
with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORD. L. REV. 125, 174 (2011) (explaining that private 
ordering “enables each corporation to become a laboratory of corporate governance, 
experimenting with different models of shareholder participation and ultimately 
producing a diversity of governance forms and practices.”). 
8 2018 Del. Ch. Lexis 318; 2019 Del. Ch. Lexis 307. 
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provides to private companies seeking to control the exercise of appraisal 
rights through shareholder agreements.9 
The extension of appraisal waivers to public companies offers a 
potentially attractive solution to a somewhat different problem, that of 
excessive appraisal litigation, sometimes termed appraisal arbitrage.10  
Appraisal litigation involving public companies is, for various reasons, 
primarily an issue for target companies incorporated in Delaware.11 
Between 2012 and 2016, the quantity of appraisal litigation in Delaware 
quadrupled.12  The Delaware cases were filed primarily by sophisticated 
 
9 See, e.g., Christopher B. Chuff, Contracting Out of Appraisal Rights, HARV. L. 
SCHOOL FOR. ON CORP. GOV., Oct. 23, 2018, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/23/contracting-out-of-appraisal-rights/ (“The 
court’s decision . . . brings further certainty to private equity and venture capital 
investors whose investments include drag-along rights with appraisal waivers.”). 
10 Appraisal arbitrage has been defined as “the practice of purchasing shares of stock 
after announcement of a merger, with a view to exercising the statutory right to an 
award of “fair value” in lieu of the merger price.” Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael 
L. Wachter, Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation: Deal Price, Deal 
Process, and Synergies, 73 BUS. LAW. 961 (2018). 
11 Delaware is home to the majority of publicly-traded corporations.  Delaware law is 
distinctive with respect to merger litigation in two ways, however.  First, unlike many 
states, the Delaware statute provides an appraisal remedy to shareholders of a publicly-
traded target company in a cash-out merger.  See John Jenkins, Appraisal Rights: The 
Complicated World of Corporate Law’s Consolation Prize, DEAL LAWYERS, May-June 
2011, at 2 (“Delaware’s version of the market out denies appraisal rights to a 
shareholder of an actively traded corporation only if the merger consideration is also 
actively traded stock”).  Second, several decisions have reduced the scope of other 
types of litigation challenging the adequacy of merger litigation, leaving appraisal as, in 
some cases, the only viable option.  See, e.g., Matthew Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven Davidoff 
Solomon & Randall Thomas, Mootness Fees, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1777 (2019) 
(summarizing decisions that “reduced the attractiveness of merger litigation in 
Delaware”). 
12 David F. Marcus, et al., Cornerstone Research, Appraisal Litigation in Delaware: 
Trends in Petitions and Opinions, 2005-2018 (2019), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/publications/reports/appraisal-litigation-delaware-2006-
2018. 
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hedge funds and private equity funds,13 many of whom purchased their 
stakes after the announcement of the merger.14   
The use by hedge funds of appraisal litigation as an investment 
strategy has generated criticism of the structure of Delaware’s existing 
appraisal statute and proposals for legislative reform.15  In 2016, the 
Delaware legislature adopted amendments to the statute in an effort to 
reduce appraisal arbitrage.16 The growth in appraisal litigation has also 
led some commentators to urge the Delaware courts to restrict the scope 
of the appraisal remedy such as by adopting a presumption, under certain 
circumstances, that the merger price constitutes fair value.17   
 
13 Id.  See also Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance of 
Dell and DFC Global, 68 EMORY L.J. 221, 223 (2018) (“The dollar value at stake in 
appraisal claims has grown dramatically, as has the sophistication of the dissenting 
stockholders”); Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 10 (“Much of this growth has been 
driven by specialized players in the appraisal arbitrage field, one of whom (Merion 
Capital) by itself accounted for 36% of the face value of all appraisal claims during the 
measurement period (2009-2016)”). 
14 Marcus et al., supra note 12, at 5 (explaining that the funds’ strategy of appraisal 
arbitrage “involves purchasing shares after the record date and filing appraisal petitions 
with the goal of receiving an award greater than the deal price as well as statutory 
interest.”). 
15 See, e.g., Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act to Curb Appraisal 
Arbitrage Abuses, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, Feb. 10, 2015, 
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23846.15.pdf (stating 
that “The Delaware General Assembly should correct the appraisal rights regime as a 
matter of urgency”). 
16 See Paul Bork & Dean F. Hanley, Latest Amendments to Delaware Law Revise 
Appraisal Rights, SECURITIES ALERT, FoleyHoag LP, Aug. 17, 2016, 
https://foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/2016/august/latest-amendments-
to-delaware-law-revise-appraisal-rights (describing appraisal arbitrage and observing 
that “[t]he amendments to Section 262 reflect an effort to limit the use of appraisal 
rights for this kind of arbitrage.”). 
17 See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge et al., Brief of Law and Corporate Finance Professors 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal, DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value 
Partners, L.P. (Jan. 6, 2017), at 16. (proposing amount awarded in appraisal proceeding 
depart from deal price only “where the transaction price bears indications of 
misinformation or bias.”); Guhan Subramanian, Using the Deal Price for Determining 
“Fair Value” in Appraisal Proceedings, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING 
TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (2019) (advocating that courts “defer entirely to the 
deal price when the deal process is good . . . but cast a “hard look” as to whether the 
deal process included an adequate market canvass, meaningful price discovery, and an 
arms-length negotiation”). 
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It is unclear, however, that either courts or legislatures are well-
positioned to determine the appropriate scope of the appraisal remedy.18   
In an era in which corporate law has increasingly endorsed private 
ordering which relies primarily on voluntary investor behavior and the 
capital markets to discipline value-decreasing contractual terms, the 
prospect of addressing the appraisal remedy through private ordering is 
worth consideration.   
In public companies, however, appraisal waivers are 
unprecedented.  One likely reason is uncertainty about whether a court 
would uphold a charter provision or bylaw that purported to eliminate 
shareholders’ appraisal rights.  The Delaware appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. 
§ 262, does not explicitly authorize corporations to reduce or eliminate 
appraisal rights.19  Corporations might therefore perceive statutory 
appraisal rights to be a mandatory component of corporate law – one that 
is not susceptible to private ordering.20  
The Manti court largely avoided the issue by concluding that the 
shareholder agreement in question “did not restrict the appraisal rights of 
the classes of stock held by the Petitioners; instead, the Petitioners, by 
entering the SA, agreed to forbear from exercising that right.”21 
Nonetheless, on reargument, the court rejected the argument that § 262 
constituted a mandatory provision of Delaware law that could not be 
waived ex ante.  Instead the court held that, on the facts before it, a 
waiver was consistent with the statute, noting “that the DGCL does not 
explicitly prohibit contractual modification or waiver of appraisal 
rights.”22 
The Manti court’s analysis has limited application to the public 
company context, in which an appraisal waiver would, by necessity, 
have to take the form of a charter or bylaw provision and in which the 
contractual features that Manti emphasized – that the parties to the 
 
18 See, e.g., Sam Glasscock III, Ruminations on Appraisal, 35 DEL. LAWYER 11 (2017), 
http://www.delawarebarfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/DeLawSUM17-
FINAL.pdf (asking the question: “If a stockholder’s right to appraisal upon dissent 
from a ‘clean’ merger is stripped, the question is whether such a regime will limit the 
flow of capital to corporations”). 
19 8 Del. C. § 262 (2020). 
20 See generally Fisch, supra note 6 (discussing extent to which corporate law contains 
mandatory rules that are not subject to private ordering). 
21 Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 318, *11-
12, 
22 Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 307, *11. 
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shareholder agreement were informed, sophisticated and advised by 
counsel – are not present.  The extension to public companies raises two 
broader and related questions – should appraisal rights be subject to 
private ordering and, if so, does current law permit such private ordering 
through the charter and bylaws?  This Article addresses both questions in 
the affirmative but concludes that appraisal waivers should be limited to 
charter provisions to provide sufficient procedural protection for the 
rights of minority shareholders. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly reviews the 
appraisal remedy and identifies the problems that have arisen in appraisal 
litigation including appraisal arbitrage and the methodology for 
determining fair value. Part II describes how private companies have 
used shareholder agreements to limit appraisal litigation through 
provisions including drag-along rights and appraisal waivers.  Part III 
considers the policy case for appraisal waivers and concludes that 
corporations should be able to limit or eliminate appraisal rights through 
private ordering.   
Having made the policy case for appraisal waivers, the Article 
considers in Part IV the legal question flagged by the Manti court -- 
whether appraisal rights are a mandatory component of corporate law.  
The Article identifies the primary arguments for and against reading the 
current statute to permit private ordering.  Ultimately, the Article 
concludes that existing case law on the mandatory/enabling distinction 
can be read to support either conclusion.  This legal uncertainty is 
problematic both because it has a potential chilling effect on the adoption 
of appraisal waivers in public companies and because of the deficiencies 
of shareholder agreements as a vehicle for appraisal waivers.23  Instead, 
the Article argues in Part V for the amendment of appraisal statutes to 
provide that corporations can modify, limit or eliminate appraisal rights, 
but that they can do so only through a charter provision.   
The Article concludes that existing efforts by private companies 
to use shareholder agreements to limit appraisal rights is evidence that 
such limitations are potentially efficient.  Legal clarity would enable a 
more robust exploration of this issue.  Allowing public companies to 
amend their charters to adopt appraisal waivers would enlist market 
 
23 I explore the problems with using shareholder agreements to implement firm-specific 
corporate governance in Fisch, supra note 6. 
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discipline into evaluating the merits of the appraisal remedy and reduce 
the burden imposed on courts by existing appraisal statutes. 
 
I.  The Appraisal Remedy 
 
 A.  Background 
 
Appraisal has its roots in corporate law statutes adopted in the 
late 1880s that adopted the appraisal remedy in conjunction with 
eliminating the requirement that shareholders unanimously consent to a 
merger.24  Today, all fifty states provide dissenting shareholders with an 
appraisal remedy, although the nature of the remedy and the 
circumstances in which it applies vary substantially.25 The appraisal 
remedy is limited to shareholders who dissent from a corporate 
transaction – that is, shareholders who do not vote their stock in favor.26  
Statutes typically contain various procedural requirements necessary for 
a shareholder to pursue his or her appraisal rights.27  If the requirements 
are met, a dissenting shareholder is entitled to be paid, in cash, the 
judicially-determined fair value of his or her shares.28  
The original purpose of the appraisal remedy was to provide 
liquidity for shareholders in situations in which the nature of the business 
in which they had invested was undergoing a fundamental change.29 In 
 
24 Charlotte Newell, The Legislative Origins of Today’s Appraisal Debate, DEL. 
LAWYEr (Summer 2017), at 12, http://www.delawarebarfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/DeLawSUM17-FINAL.pdf.  
25 See, e.g., Shawnee Telecom Resources, Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 556 (Ky. 
2011) ("Dissenters' rights statutes . . . exist in some form in every state, and in the vast 
majority of the states, protection is accorded by an appraisal remedy . . . ."); Athlon 
Sports Communs., Inc. v. Duggan, 549 S.W.3d 107, 118 (“Every state now has statutes 
that provide some form of appraisal remedy; these are referred to as "dissenters' rights" 
statutes”).  
26 See, e.g., Barry M. Wertheimer, The Purpose of the Shareholders’ Appraisal 
Remedy, 65 TENN. L. REV. 661, 663 (1998) (“The appraisal remedy allows the 
shareholder a ‘way out’ of an investment involuntarily altered by a fundamental 
corporate change.”). 
27 See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 262(d) (2020) (setting forth procedures required to perfect 
appraisal rights). 
28 Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 79 (1995). 
29 See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 11 at 1 (explaining that appraisal rights initially were 
intended to provide shareholders with “a judicial route to liquidity”). 
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some states, appraisal rights are triggered only in connection with 
mergers or similar transactions; in other states, appraisal rights apply to a 
broader range of changes such as charter amendments or the sale of a 
significant percentage of the corporation’s assets.30  Most states adopted 
appraisal statutes in conjunction with statutory amendments that reduced 
the threshold for shareholder approval of such transactions from 
unanimous consent to majority or supermajority approval.31  The 
rationale was that a shareholder who objected to “the welding of his 
corporation with another” should be free to exit the enterprise entirely.32 
Over time, the importance of providing liquidity has decreased as 
a rationale for appraisal, and the remedy has instead shifted to a tool for 
protecting the fair value of a minority shareholder’s interest in a 
corporation.33  The two dominant (and distinctive) approaches to 
appraisal are reflected in the Delaware corporate statute and the Model 
Business Corporation Act (MBCA).34  Academic commentary has 
focused primarily on Delaware appraisal law for several reasons: 
Delaware is unique in providing appraisal rights in certain public-
company mergers, more than 60 % of publicly-traded companies are 
incorporated in Delaware, and Delaware is also the state of incorporation 
for most large private companies.35  Nonetheless, the MBCA’s 
alternative approach provides important insights into how best to 
understand both appraisal rights and the potential impact of appraisal 
waivers on those rights. 
 
30 See Siegel, supra note 28 at 91-92 (summarizing variation among the states as to 
which transactions trigger appraisal rights). 
31 See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, CORPORATE LAW 443-44 (1986) ("Historically, appraisal 
rights seem to have been given to shareholders as the quid pro quo for abandonment of 
the old nineteenth century rule that major corporate changes like mergers require the 
unanimous consent of all the shareholders."); 
32 Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934), 
33 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role 
in Corporate Law., 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (appraisal’s “original liquidity purpose has 
almost completely disappeared”). 
34 See, e.g., Mary Siegel, The Model Business corporation Act at Sixty: An Appraisal of 
the Modern Business Corporation Act’s Appraisal Rights Provisions, 74 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 231, 231 (2011) (explaining that “the two statutes are diametrically 
opposed on many key elements”); Jenkins, supra note 11 at 4 (“Appraisal rights statutes 
are one area of corporate law where Delaware’s influence is far from pervasive.”). 
35 Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2000). 
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 Delaware takes a limited approach, providing statutory appraisal 
rights only in connection with a merger or consolidation.36  Appraisal 
rights in Delaware are not exclusive; shareholders can pursue a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty either as an alternative to or in conjunction with 
a demand for appraisal.37  The Delaware statute entitles shareholders 
who dissent from a merger to a judicial determination of “fair value.”38  
The concept of fair value and the methodology for determining fair value 
have generated substantial case law and commentary, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section.   
 The Delaware statute provides a “market out,” as do most 
appraisal statutes, which eliminates appraisal rights for shareholders in 
publicly-traded companies.39  The Delaware statute is distinctive, 
however, in that it restores appraisal rights to such shareholders if they 
receive cash as the merger consideration.40  As a result, a substantial 
number of third party mergers in Delaware public corporations trigger 
appraisal rights; it is these transactions that provide the basis for 
appraisal arbitrage.   
 
36 See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts 
Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 613 n. 2 (1998) (comparing Delaware’s 
approach to the broader approach of the MBCA and the states that follow it); Siegel, 
supra note 34, at 234 (“Only two jurisdictions, however, follow the Delaware statute in 
providing mergers as the sole statutorily-required appraisal trigger.”).   
37 Appraisal is, however, the exclusive remedy in short-form mergers in Delaware.  See 
Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (holding that 
"absent fraud or illegality, appraisal is the exclusive remedy available to a minority 
stockholder who objects to a short-form merger"). 
38 8 Del. C. § 262(a) (2020). 
39 See Onyeador, supra note 2 at 359 (reporting that 37 states have adopted a market out 
exception to appraisal rights). 
40 See id. (terming this the “cash carve-out”).  Delaware substantially revised its 
corporate law in 1967, and one of the proposals of the revision committee was a 
recommendation that Delaware eliminate the appraisal remedy entirely for publicly-
traded companies, based on the rationale that the stock market provided dissenting 
shareholders with both an exit opportunity and an established value – the market price.  
Newell, supra note 24, citing Folk Report, http://www.delawarebarfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/DeLawSUM17-FINAL.pdf The Delaware legislature did not 
adopt this recommendation, a decision except in the case of stock-for-stock mergers, a 
distinction that puzzled the revision committee and continues to puzzle commentators.  
Id.  Professor Ernest L. Folk III, the reporter for the revision project, also proposed 
eliminating appraisal rights unless otherwise provided in a corporation’s charter.  
Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 7 
(2000). 
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With respect to private ordering, the Delaware statute authorizes 
a corporation, in its charter, to provide additional appraisal rights, 
although the statute seemingly does not permit a bylaw or board 
resolution to confer additional appraisal rights.41  Nothing in the 
Delaware statute explicitly authorizes a corporation to limit or eliminate 
appraisal rights. 
In 2016, Delaware adopted two amendments to its appraisal 
statute in response to concerns about appraisal arbitrage.  The first is a de 
minimis threshold for appraisal actions in publicly-traded companies 
eliminates appraisal in such companies unless the number of shares 
entitled to appraisal exceeds 1% of the company’s outstanding shares, is 
valued at more than $1 million (based on the value of the merger 
consideration) or the transaction involves a short form merger.42  The 
second amendment allows a corporation to pre-pay an amount to 
dissenting shareholders prior to the entry of judgment in the appraisal 
proceeding and to thereby stop the accrual of interest at the statutory 
rate.43  
The MBCA was first published in 1950, and its goal was to 
provide “greater clarify for a variety of transactions through bright line 
rules and safe harbors.”44  States following the MBCA approach 
generally provide appraisal rights in connection with a variety of 
transactions including not just mergers but also share exchanges, a sale 
or disposition of substantially all the corporation’s assets, amendments to 
the corporation’s charter, and conversion or domestication.45    
 
41 See 8 Del. C. § 262(c) (2020). 
42 8 Del. C. § 262(g) (2020). 
43 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (2020).  Some commentators had suggested that the statutory 
formula for the calculation of statutory interest made appraisal litigation profitable for 
investors even in cases in which the merger consideration constituted fair value.  See 
Charles K. Korsmo & Minor Myer, Interest in Appraisal, 42 IOWA J. CORP. L. 109, 111 
(2016) (“Critics contend that this interest rate has been a prime driver of the increase in 
appraisal activity, with sophisticated "appraisal arbitrageurs" parking money in 
appraisal claims in order to take advantage of what critics contend is an above-market 
interest rate.”). 
44 William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, Symposium: The Mystery of the Success 
of Delaware Law: The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 57. 
45 MBCA § 13.02(a) Siegel, supra note 34, at 232 (describing transaction triggers in the 
MBCA); id. at 234 (summarizing degree to which adopting states follow the MBCA’s 
approach to transaction triggers). 
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Three features of the MBCA are distinctive relative to Delaware 
law. 46 First, The market-out rule under the MBCA provides that 
appraisal rights are not available to the holders of shares that are listed 
on a national securities exchange or held by a sufficiently large number 
of shareholders.47  Unlike Delaware, the market-out rule does not exempt 
transactions involving cash consideration. The 1999 revisions to the 
MBCA, however, limited the market-out exception to transactions that 
did not involve a conflict of interest.48  As of 2011, thirty-six state 
statutes had adopted some form of market-out exception, and eleven 
limit that exception to non-conflict transactions.49 
 Second, the MBCA provides that, in transactions subject to 
appraisal and in which the market-out does not apply, appraisal shall be 
the exclusive remedy.50 A substantial number of states have followed 
this approach and expressly provide that, with limited exceptions, in 
cases in which the appraisal remedy applies, it is the exclusive way to 
challenge a transaction.51 
 
46 The MBCA also contains a variety of procedural differences from the Delaware 
statute. For example, Delaware does not require a corporation to pay dissenting 
shareholders until the conclusion of the appraisal proceeding (although statutory 
interest accrues during the proceeding).  The MBCA does not delay compensation until 
the outcome of the appraisal proceeding but requires the corporation to pay dissenting 
shareholders its estimate of the fair value of their stock, plus interest, within thirty days 
of the appraisal demand.  MBCA § 13.24.  In addition, the MBCA places the initial 
obligation on the corporation to determine fair value.  If the shareholder is dissatisfied 
with the corporation’s decision and demands a judicial valuation, it is the corporation’s 
obligation to commence an appraisal proceeding. MBCA § 13.30.  
47 MBCA § 13.02(b). 
48 Siegel, supra note 34. 
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., Mitchell Partners, L.P. v. Irex Corp. The MBCA provides additional 
exceptions for transactions that are not in compliance with the procedures required by 
the statute or the corporations charter as well as transactions that are “procured as a 
result of fraud, a material misrepresentation, or an omission of a material fact necessary 
to make statements made, in light of the circumstances in which they were made, not 
misleading.”  MBCA §13.40(b)(2) (2019). 
51 Thirty-three states expressly provide that the appraisal remedy is the exclusive 
remedy in some circumstances. Of these, twenty-two jurisdictions have provisions 
comparable to § 13.02(b) of the Revised Model Act's language providing the appraisal 
remedy is exclusive except where the corporation action is "unlawful [or illegal] or 
fraudulent." Julie Gwyn Hudson, Comment: The Exclusivity of the Appraisal Remedy 
Under the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act: Deciding the Standard of 
Review for Cash-Out Mergers., 69 N.C.L. REV. 501, 503 (1992).  Again, however, 
several states have adopted different approaches. See McMinn v. MBF Operating 
13 
 
Third, the MBCA provides corporations with somewhat greater 
explicit freedom than the Delaware statute to modify statutory appraisal 
rights.  Section 13.02(a)(5) authorizes a corporation to provide appraisal 
rights in certain other transactions through charter provision, bylaw or 
board resolution.  In addition, section 13.02(c) authorizes a corporation, 
through a charter provision, to limit or eliminate appraisal rights for 
preferred stockholders, but the statute provides that such a charter 
amendment will not apply to transactions that occur within a year of its 
adoption.52 
 
B. Appraisal and Fair Value 
 
 The critical component of an appraisal proceeding is the 
determination of fair value.  As a result, both commentators and the 
courts themselves have focused extensively on the appropriate 
methodology for this determination.53  The Delaware courts have 
consistently explained that “fair value is the value of the company to the 
stockholder as a going concern,”54 and the court’s task is to determine 
the most reliable measure of fair value.  Delaware has developed the 
most extensive jurisprudence on what constitutes fair value in appraisal 
proceedings, and other courts consistently look to Delaware decisions for 
guidance.55 
 
Acquisition Corp., 142 N.M. 160, 168 (N.Mex. Sup. 2007) (considering and rejecting 
exclusivity despite clear statute and failure to adopt MBCA amendments). 
52 The provision further limits waivers to cases in which the preferred stock has the 
right to vote separately on the transaction giving rise to the appraisal rights.  Notably, 
many statutes tie appraisal rights to the power to vote on a transaction and, as a result, 
the right of non-voting preferred to exercise appraisal rights, in the absence of an 
explicit provision of such rights in the certificate of designation, may not be clear. See, 
e.g., Application of Harwitz, 192 Misc. 91, 94 (N.Y. Sup. 1948) (“preferred nonvoting 
stockholders acquire no appraisal rights under [the N.Y. statute]”).  
53 See, e.g., Onyeador, supra note 2, at 340 (“appraisal arbitrage has sparked a close 
look at Delaware courts' methodology in appraisal proceedings”) 
54 Verition P’rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 132–33 (Del. 
2019). 
55 See, e.g., Reynolds Am. Inc. v. Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd., 2020 NCBC 
35, *312 (“Although Delaware's appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262, is not identical to 
section 55-13-30, the two statutes each require a determination of "fair value" and are 
sufficiently similar that the Court finds decisions of the Delaware courts under section 
262, although not binding, to be helpful guidance in interpreting the North Carolina 
appraisal statute and deciding the fair value of RAI's shares in this action”). 
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 As VC Laster explained, the statutory task of making “a single 
determination of a corporation’s value introduces an impression of false 
precision into appraisal jurisprudence.”56  Valuation is not a precise 
science, all valuation methodologies have inherent limitations and law-
trained judges are themselves limited in their ability to evaluate valuation 
evidence.  As a result, it is perhaps easier to understand the judge’s task 
as determining “the most reasonable value in light of all the relevant 
evidence and based on considerations of fairness.”57  This task, however, 
opens appraisal litigation to a wide-ranging exercise in valuation.  As 
one Delaware court observed, “fair value has become a jurisprudential, 
rather than purely economic, construct.”58 
 For many years, courts commonly used the so-called Delaware 
block method to value stock in appraisal proceedings.59  The Delaware 
block method required courts to determine the corporation’s value using 
three separate methods: asset value, earnings value, and market value. 
The court would then decide on a proportionate weight to be given to 
each of these three valuations and determine the fair value of the 
corporation according to a weighted average of the three values., in 
which fair value was based on a weighted average of market value, asset 
value, and earnings value.60  Delaware’s block method was highly 
influential, and many jurisdictions followed Delaware’s approach.61  
Because the block method tended to undervalue stock,62 this 
 
56 In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 303 
57 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 
2003), as revised (July 9, 2004) (emphasis added). 
58 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 20 (Del. 
2017). 
59 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950); see Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware 
Appraisal Law, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 119, 124 (2005) (“for decades prior to 1983, courts 
measured the intrinsic value of stock using the Delaware block method”). 
60 See, e.g., Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 348-
52 (Del. Ch. 1973) (determining fair value by Delaware block method), aff'd, 334 A.2d 
216 (Del. 1975). 
61 See, e.g., Don S. Clardy, Comment: Valuation of Dissenters’ Stock Under the 
appraisal Remedy – is the Delaware Block Method Right for Tennessee?  62 TENN. L. 
REV. 285, 298-299 (1995) (“In the post-World War II period, Delaware courts and 
virtually all other jurisdictions began to use the Delaware Block Method in appraisal 
proceedings”). 
62 See, e.g., Newell, supra note 24 (explaining that courts expressly distinguished 
between the block method and fair value). 
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methodology was an important factor limiting the frequency of appraisal 
litigation.63   
 In the Weinberger decision, the Delaware Supreme Court 
replaced the block method, holding that fair value should be determined 
with “proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally 
considered acceptable in the financial community.”64  The appropriate 
valuation methodology to be used in appraisal cases continues to be the 
subject of ongoing development and legal uncertainty.   
 Following Weinberger, most courts began to rely primarily on the 
discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology.65  Under the DCF method, the 
value of the corporation is calculated by determining “present value of 
the discounted stream of future free cash flows that the asset can 
generate.”66  The challenge with the DCF methodology is that it is 
largely based on assumptions – such as assumptions about future cash 
flows and the choice of an appropriate discount rate – rather than 
objective historical facts.67   
 In appraisal proceedings, the parties typically present valuation 
analyses prepared by expert witnesses, and the assumptions employed by 
those experts may differ dramatically.68  Concern over the potential 
imprecision of many of these methodologies, as well as the recognition 
that “paid valuation experts have assumed more of an advocacy role, and 
less of a traditional expert witness role (as illustrated by the wide deltas 
 
63 See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note 36 at 625 (explaining that the valuation 
methodology used in appraisal cases “powerfully explains the relative dearth of pre-
1983 appraisal proceedings.”); Elmer J. Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighting Asset Value 
and Earnings Value in the Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 
1036-40 (1982) (stating that “the weighting method [used in the block method] always 
undervalues corporate stock”). 
64 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713-14 (Del. 1983). 
65 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 59, at 125 (“[T]he court of chancery has 
increasingly come to favor ‘discounted cash flow’ (DCF) analysis of modern finance 
theory as the core approach to measuring value.”) 
66 Id. at 125. 
67 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Petsmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, *33 (Del. Ch. 2017) 
(explaining the difficulty of using DCF analysis where management’s projections “are 
saddled with nearly all of these telltale indicators of unreliability”). 
68 See, e.g., In re Emerging Communs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, 
*40-41 (observing that the experts’ “widely differing valuations of the same company 
result from quite different financial assumptions that each sponsoring side exhorts this 
Court to accept.”). 
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we regularly see in their valuation conclusions)”69 led the courts to 
search for indicators of fair value based on prices paid by willing market 
participants.  This has led to increased consideration of the merger or 
deal price and unaffected trading price.70  Several more recent Delaware 
opinions consider the circumstances under which either or both of these 
prices are reliable indicators of fair value. 
 The cases rely most heavily on deal price as the best indicator of 
fair value.  For example, in DCF Global, the Delaware Supreme Court 
reversed  a chancery court decision that had calculated fair value by 
equally weighing deal price, the DCF valuation, and a comparable 
companies valuation, concluding that the lower court’s reasons for 
failing to give greater weight to the deal price were not supported by the 
record.71  Although the court expressly warned that deal price need not 
always be the exclusive or best evidence of fair value, it observed that it 
was improper to ignore “the economic reality that the sale value resulting 
from a robust market check will often be the most reliable evidence of 
fair value, and that second-guessing the value arrived upon by the 
collective views of many sophisticated parties with a real stake in the 
matter is hazardous.”72  Similarly in Dell, the Supreme Court again 
concluded that the chancery court had given insufficient weight to deal 
price.  The Dell court explained the basis for its reasoning that deal price 
was, at least in the context of the case before it, a more reliable indicator 
than DCF, noting  as well as “the obvious lack of credibility of the 
petitioners' DCF model.”73  The court remanded with the instruction that 
the Vice Chancellor could “enter judgment at the deal price if he so 
chooses, with no further proceedings.”74 
 
69 Blueblade Capital Opportunities, LLC v. Norcraft Cos., Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
255, *32 n. 179. 
70 Although experts in appraisal litigation commonly present a comparable companies 
analysis as well, courts rarely place substantial weight on the valuation produced by this 
analysis, largely because of the difficulty establishing a suitable peer group.  See, e.g.,  
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 271, *72 (explaining that “nearly 
every text in the record states that the accuracy of a multiples-based valuation depends 
entirely on the existence of comparable peers” and giving the comparable companies 
analysis no weight based on the court’s finding that Jarden had no comparable peers). 
71 DFC Global Corp. v Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. 172 A.2d 346, 388 (Del. 2016). 
72 Id. at 366. 
73 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 36 (Del. 
2017). 
74 Id. at 44 
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 The use of deal price involves two complications.  The first is 
determining the circumstances under which a court is justified in 
deferring to deal price as the most reliable indicator of fair value.  On the 
one hand, the courts have emphasized the fact that the negotiation of a 
merger, particularly by an arms-length third party buyer, is likely to lead 
to robust pricing.  The likelihood that the buyer has access to all material 
information about the target, including non-public information, 
strengthens this claim.75  On the other hand, not every deal process is 
robust.  To the extent that a deal process is flawed, the resulting merger 
price may not be fair.76  The courts have identified the components of a 
reliable sales process as including “evidence of market efficiency, fair 
play, low barriers to entry, [and] outreach to all logical buyers….”77  
While the presence of multiple bidders is evidence of a reliable deal 
process, even a single bidder process may be acceptable if the process 
includes a suitable market check.78 
 The second complication is the fact that, in most cases, a deal 
itself creates value – the so-called synergies of the merger.  In an arms-
length third-party merger, these synergies will be shared by the 
shareholders of the two companies.79  As a result, the deal price received 
by the target shareholders exceeds fair value.  To be faithful to the 
statutory language, a calculation of fair value should subtract these 
 
75 See, e.g., Verition Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 
138 (Del. 2019) (“[W]hen th[e] market price is further informed by the efforts of arm’s 
length buyers of the entire company to learn more through due diligence, involving 
confidential non-public information, and with the keener incentives of someone 
considering taking the non-diversifiable risk of buying the entire entity, the price that 
results from that process is even more likely to be indicative of so-called fundamental 
value.”) 
76 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of SWS Group, In re Appraisal of SWS Grp., Inc., 2017 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 90 (Del. Ch., May 30, 2017), aff'd sub nom. Merlin Partners, LP v. 
SWS Grp., Inc., 2018 Del. LEXIS 77 (Del., Feb. 23, 2018) (rejecting reliance on 
merger price based on flawed sales process). 
77 Dell, 177 A.3d at 35. 
78 See, e.g., In re Stillwater Mining Co., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, *71-72.  The 
Stillwater court provided further guidance, explaining that “the deal price will provide 
persuasive evidence of fair value in an appraisal proceeding involving a publicly traded 
firm if the sale process would satisfy enhanced scrutiny in a breach of fiduciary duty 
case.”  Id. at *72. 
79 Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 59 at 142.   
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synergies.80  Calculating synergies, however, reintroduces an element of 
imprecision into the valuation process because the calculation is not a 
market-based process and relies instead on the type of judgment 
associated with the DCF methodology.81  Recent decisions have 
allocated the burden of establishing deal synergies on the respondent 
and, as a result, have frequently refused to subtract any synergies from 
the merger price.82  
 The alternative to deal price is “unaffected market price.”83  In 
Aruba I, the Chancery court determined that unaffected market price was 
 
80 See, e.g., Global GT LP v Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A2d 497, 507 (Del Ch 2010) 
(stating that deriving an estimate of fair value requires the exclusion of “any synergies 
or other value expected from the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself”) 
81 See, e.g., Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 52, *5, rev’d by Verition Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 
2019 Del. LEXIS 197 (Del. 2019) (“Estimating synergies requires exercises of human 
judgment analogous to those involved in crafting a discounted cash flow valuation.”); 
Raffaele Fiorentino & Stefano Garzella, The Synergy Valuation Models: Towards the 
Real Value of Mergers and Acquisitions, 124 INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON. 71, 72 (2014) 
(“[T]heoretical and empirical research still lacks a common understanding of the 
effectiveness of synergy valuation models in M&A.”); Hamermesh & Wachter, supra 
note 10, at 983 (identifying three different approaches to calculating synergies). 
82 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 303, 
*122 (“[Respondent] bore the burden of proving a downward adjustment for 
synergies.”); Stillwater Mining, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, *140-41(“[Respondent] 
failed to meet its burden of proof to establish a quantifiable amount that the court 
should deduct from the deal price.”).  But see In re Panera Bread Co., 2020 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 42, *92 (concluding that “respondent has proven deduction of cost and tax 
synergies of $11.56 per share by a preponderance of the evidence”). 
83 See, e.g., Alex Pena & Brian JM Quinn, Appraisal Confusion: The Intended and 
Unintended Consequences of Delaware’s Nascent Pristine Deal Process Standard, 103 
MARQ. L. REV. 457, 507-8 (2019) (arguing that courts should “look to unaffected stock 
price rather than merger price for indications of fair value” and observing that using 
unaffected market price reflects “a return to the roots of appraisal before the recent 
attentions given to it by the financial industry”).  There are, however, problems with 
unaffected market price.  The public trading price may reflect a minority discount and, 
even if it does not, the parties to a deal may have access to material non-public 
information that, if released, would affect stock price.  See Brian J. Broughman, et al., 
Amicus Brief of Law and Finance Professors in Verition Partners v. Aruba Networks 
(Appraisal Lawsuit) (October 3, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3302116 (identifying 
these and other concerns about the use of unaffected trading price in appraisal 
proceedings). 
19 
 
the best indicator of fair value because the target’s shares “were widely 
traded on a public market based upon a rich information basis…."84 
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed this decision, however, in a 
decision that strongly suggested that deal price, at least under the 
circumstances present in the case, was more reliable.85  Notwithstanding 
that decision, in Jarden, the chancery court again relied on unaffected 
market price based on its determination that flaws in the deal process 
made deal price unreliable.86  The Jarden court noted that, because the 
market for Jarden’s stock was efficient and that the market price 
reflected all material information, “Jarden's Unaffected Market Price is a 
powerful indicator of Jarden's fair value on the Merger Date.”87 
 The calculation of fair value in the private company context is 
even more difficult.88  Private companies obviously lack an unaffected 
market price that can be used as a reference point.89  In addition, 
although public companies produce and disclose a variety of financial 
information in a standardized format, the quality of private company 
financial information varies substantially.90  In addition, private company 
shareholders may have distinctive interests or expectations that 
potentially affect the determination of fair value.  Finally, private 
companies often have substantial or controlling shareholders that are 
involved in the merger negotiations and that may have interests that 
 
84 Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
52, *98. 
85 See Verition Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 
2019) (holding that the chancery court had provided insufficient bases for failing to 
give greater weight to deal price). 
86 In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 271. 
87 Id. at *63 
88 For an example, see In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
125, *8 (observing that “The gap between the expert valuations is wide—alarmingly 
so—ranging from $106 million to $820 million”). 
89 Similarly, private companies frequently lack public company peers whose prices can 
be used for comparison.  See id. at *10 (noting that “ISN has no public competitors”) 
90 See id. at *15 (observing that DCF calculation was complicated by the fact that “ISN 
itself did not regularly create long-term financial projections”); Laidler v. Hesco 
Bastion Envtl., Inc., 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, *29-30 (using a “direct capitalization of 
cash flow analysis because of “the lack of comparable companies or transactions upon 
which to base an analysis, and the lack of management projections upon which to 
conduct a DCF”).. 
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differ from those of the minority stockholders.  As a result, the deal 
process is less likely to be reliable.91   
 Efforts to value shares of private companies in other contexts, 
contexts that are less fraught than mergers, illustrate the challenges.  For 
example, private companies that issue stock to employees are required to 
provide 409A valuations every twelve months.92  Although these 
valuations are supposed to reflect the fair value of the stock, they are 
notoriously open to manipulation.93  Similarly, many investors, such as 
mutual funds, are required, for regulatory purposes, to determine the fair 
value of the stock they own in private companies.  Reports suggest that 
these valuations vary dramatically among sophisticated investors even 
with respect to the shares of late stage private companies with significant 
operating track records.94 
 
C. Public Company Appraisal Arbitrage 
 
 Uncertainty both about the valuation methodology a court will 
employ and how it will apply that methodology increases the potential 
for appraisal litigation.95 Moreover, appraisal litigation is time-
consuming, costly and difficult.  Significantly, because an appraisal 
proceeding does not require allegations of misconduct, appraisal claims 
 
91 See, e.g., Laidler v. Hesco Bastion Envtl., Inc., 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, *22 (“to 
defer to an interested controlling stockholder's determination of fair value in a 
transaction such as this would render [the appraisal] remedy illusory”). See also Pena & 
Quinn, supra note 83 at 509 (observing that “private companies will neither have the 
benefit of merger price nor unaffected stock price for purposes of valuation,” requiring 
courts to fall back upon traditional metrics such as DCF). 
92 See, e.g., Yifat Aran, Making Disclosure work for Start-up Employees, 2019 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 867, 947 (describing the 409A valuation process). 
93 Id. at 949-50 (“these valuations are highly inaccurate and can be negotiated down by 
the company.”). 
94 See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham & Coulter Jones, Mutual Funds’ Embrace of High-Profile 
Unicorns Backfires, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/mutual-
funds-embrace-of-high-profile-unicorns-backfires-11570786202 (observing that 
valuation of We shares in 2018 by large asset management firms varied by as much as 
67%). 
95 Cf. William Landes & Richard Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 269-70 (1976) (explaining, as uncertainty in 
the law increases, “parties to a dispute would find it more difficult to forecast the 
outcome of litigation, and litigation would increase”). 
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are not readily dismissed at the pleadings stage, and the terms of the 
transaction are not protected by the business judgment rule.   
 Between 2006 and 2018, 34 appraisal cases went to trial in 
Delaware.96  The average time from when the appraisal petition was filed 
until the trial court opinion was issued was 2 years, 8 months.97  
Litigated cases result in lengthy trial court opinions as courts assess “all 
the relevant evidence” about value which includes, as a result of the 
effort to determine the reliability of the deal price, a detailed analysis of 
the strengths and weakness of the deal process.98 That record is often 
reevaluated and frequently overturned on appeal.99   
 Appraisal litigation involving Delaware-incorporated public 
companies (in which there no market out for cash mergers) has also 
increased due to the rise of appraisal arbitrage.100  The number of 
appraisal filings began to increase dramatically, beginning in 2011.101  
As Korsmo and Myers report, “During 2015, more than $2 billion of 
stock dissented in Delaware, and in 2016, 20% of public company 
transactions faced an appraisal claim”102  The volume of both merger 
filings and deals challenged continued to grow in 2017.103 
 
96 Marcus, et al., supra note 12.  The trials have continued in 2019. See, e.g. In re 
Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 303; In re Appraisal 
of Jarden Corp., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 271; In re Stillwater Mining Co., 2019 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 320. 
97 Marcus, et al., supra note 12. 
98 See, e.g., In re AOL Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63 (50 pages) (all using LEXIS 
pagination); In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 303 
(144 pages); In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81 (169 pages); In re 
DFC Global Corp., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103 (69 pages). 
99 See, e.g., Verition Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128 
(Del. 2019). 
100 Prior to approximately 2010, appraisal litigation in public companies was infrequent, 
and practitioners and commentators relatively little attention to the appraisal remedy in 
public deals.  See Craig Boyd, Appraisal Arbitrage: Closing the Floodgates on Hedge 
Funds and Activist Shareholders, 65 KAN. L. REV. 497, 502 (2016) (“Over the past 
decade, appraisal claims have had a limited presence in Delaware courts”); see also Wei 
Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei, & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or 
Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J. LAW & ECON. 697, 699 (2016) (documenting that appraisal 
“petitions increase from 2-3 percent of eligible deals in the early 2000s to around 25 
percent in the 2010s.”). 
101 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 13.  
102 Id. 
103 Potter, Anderson Corroon LLP, 2017 Year in Review: The State of Appraisal in the 
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 Several developments likely contributed to the increase in 
filings104 – the favorable statutory interest provision, the Transkaryotic 
decision,105 and reductions in the viability of traditional merger 
litigation.106  Although commentators debate the relative importance of 
these developments,107 the increase in filing volume is undisputed.108   
 Because of the cost and complexity of the valuation process, 
small shareholders rarely pursue appraisal claims in public companies.109  
Instead, “that hedge funds are by far the dominant force among the 
appraisal petitioners, especially after 2010….”110  Hedge funds are 
particularly well-positioned to litigate the complex valuation issues in 
appraisal cases.  In addition, competition among hedge fund managers 
 
Delaware Courts, 
http://www.potteranderson.com/media/publication/819_Potter_Anderson_2017_Year_i
n_Review.pdf 
104 See, e.g. Jiang, et al., supra note 100, at 715 (“Some legal scholars argue that the 
landscape of appraisals changed dramatically around 2007-8, after the landmark 
Transkaryotic ruling and the 2007 amendment to the Delaware appraisal statute that set 
the default prejudgment interest rate”). 
105 In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57.  In 
Transkaryotic, the court held that shares acquired after the public announcement of a 
merger were eligible for appraisal.  The MBCA and most states other than Delaware do 
not provide appraisal rights for after-acquired shares.  See Desiree M. Baca, Note, 
Curbing Arbitrage: The Case for Reappraisal of Delaware’s Appraisal Rights, 13 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 425, 455 (“In thirty states, shareholders must certify in their 
demand payment that they had purchased their shares prior to the announcement of the 
merger,”). 
106 Decisions like In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). and Corwin v. KKR Fin. 
Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). made it more difficult both to win a lawsuit 
challenging a merger and for plaintiffs’ attorneys to recover fees in connection with the 
settlement of such a lawsuit.  See Matthew D. Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven Davidoff 
Solomon & Randall Thomas, The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 603, 606-7 (2018) (explaining the effect of these decisions on the difficulty of a 
successful recovery in cases challenging the fairness of a merger). 
107 See, e.g. Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of 
Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2015) (claiming, based on 
empirical analysis of appraisal filings, to “confidently dismiss” efforts to explain the 
increase in merger filings by either the Transkaryotic decision or the new statutory 
interest rate in appraisal cases). 
108 See, e.g. Jiang, et al., supra note 100 (documenting the increase). 
109 Unlike class action claims, appraisal claims can only be brought on behalf of 
dissenting shareholders, which reduces the potential recovery and, for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, the potential size of the fee award in a successful case. 
110 Jiang et al., supra note 100, at 704. 
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has increased the attraction of appraisal litigation as an investment 
strategy.  Since 2004, the number of hedge funds has more than doubled, 
and the financial crisis of 2008 led to a low interest rate environment, an 
increase in passive investing and a number of other industry changes that 
hurt hedge fund performance.111  Appraisal litigation offered an 
attractive and relatively low risk strategy, a strategy that was facilitated 
by the interest rate available in litigation.112 
 At least some commentators have argued that appraisal arbitrage 
is abusive and creates a need to modify or eliminate statutory appraisal 
rights.113 Similarly, the Delaware courts’ recent move in valuation 
methodology from DCF toward measures such as deal price minus 
synergies can be understood both as a way to make the appraisal process 
more objective and as a way of reducing the potential return to hedge 
funds from appraisal litigation.114   
 Some commentators have also expressed concern that the risk of 
appraisal litigation has adverse effects on the quality of deals.  For 
example, buyers concerned about the risk and potential cost of appraisal 
litigation may include a merger-out provision that enables them to 
terminate the deal if a sufficient number of shares demand appraisal.115  
Another possibility is that buyers will negotiate a lower deal price in 
order to retain funds to pay off shareholders that demand appraisal.116  
 
111 Barry Ritholtz, The Financial Crisis Killed Hedge-Fund Performance, BLOOMBERG, 
Sept. 17, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-09-17/hedge-funds-
blame-the-financial-crisis-for-shrinking-performance. 
112 See Jiang, et al,, supra note 100, at 727 (reporting that “over half of the returns to 
appraisal filings come from prejudgment interest accruals rather than valuation 
improvements”).  
113 See, e.g., Jay B. Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 89, 90 (2017) (describing six cases in which “appraisal arbitrageurs 
challenged seemingly unobjectionable mergers”). 
114 See, e.g., Justine Drohan, The Delaware Shift in Appraisal Fair Value Methodology 
(working paper 2020). 
115 See Audra Boone, Brian Broughman & Antonio J. Macias, Merger Negotiations in 
the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal, 62 J. LAW & ECON. 281, 312-12 (2019) (describing 
and empirically examining use of appraisal out clauses); Guhan Subramanian, Using 
the Deal Price for Determining ‘Fair Value’ in Appraisal Proceedings, in THE 
CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (2020) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911880 (noting that an appraisal out clause has never been 
triggered). 
116 Kesten, supra note 113 at 129 (observing that “acquirers might view the costs of 
those claims as a form of deal tax and self-insure by lowering their bids”). 
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This practice has the potential to cause price discrimination in the merger 
terms; the small and passive investors who do not seek appraisal receive 
a lower price, while the hedge funds are able to obtain a higher 
premium.117 
 The other side of these arguments is the claim that appraisal 
litigation serves a useful role in disciplining participants in a merger.  
Several empirical studies find that the quality of the merger process is 
related to the strength of the appraisal remedy and that legislative or 
judicial decisions that restrict appraisal rights hurt shareholders.118  This 
Article returns to the issue in Part III below and argues that the potential 
costs of regulatory change to address potential excesses in merger 
litigation counsel in favor of a private ordering solution. 
 
II.  Private Ordering Solutions to Appraisal  
 
 Appraisal litigation is relatively infrequent119 in the venture-
backed private company context.120  To a degree, this may be surprising.  
Mergers have overwhelming eclipsed IPOs as the most likely exit event 
for a start-up company, and there are thousands of private company 
 
117 See, e.g., Boone, et al., supra note 115, at 283 (describing such “price 
discrimination” could “shift[] economic returns away from passive investors and 
toward arbitrage hedge funds” but finding no evidence of such price discrimination); 
Kesten, supra note 113 at 127 (“appraisal arbitrage perniciously redistributes value 
from acquirers and ordinary shareholders to the arbitrageurs.”). 
118 See, e.g., Boone, et al., supra note 115 at 285 (finding that “a strong appraisal 
regime increases returns to target shareholders.”); Scott Callahan, Darius Palia, & Eric 
Talley, Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder Value, 3 J. L. FIN & ACCT'G 147 (2018) 
(shareholders tend to receive higher premia as the strength of the appraisal remedy 
increases) See also Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the "Merger Price" 
Appraisal Rule, 34 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 543 (2019) (developing model showing that 
judicial deference to deal price in appraisal litigation undercuts the ability of appraisal 
to serve as a de facto reserve-price in a merger and therefore reduces shareholder 
welfare). 
119 But see In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013) (involving 
appraisal and breach of fiduciary duty claims by 5% stockholder in merger in which the 
common stockholders received nothing). 
120 This article does not address the use of appraisal in closely-held corporations.  Such 
corporations, which typically operate in a manner very similar to partnerships raise a 
variety of distinctive issues.  See George D. Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the 
Incorporated Partnership, 18 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 435, 435 (1953) (describing the 
distinctive legal issues of closely-held corporations). 
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mergers per year.121  In addition, virtually every private company merger 
triggers statutory appraisal rights because the market out exception does 
not apply either in Delaware or under the MBCA.122  The rationale for 
appraisal is also more compelling in private companies, as shareholders 
lack both a readily-ascertainable market price as some benchmark of 
value and the liquidity of a market sale as an alternative to the merger 
consideration.     
 One reason for the limited attention is that appraisal arbitrage is 
largely a non-event for deals involving the sale or merger of private 
companies.  There is no public market for shares in private companies, 
and indeed, there may be no public announcement of the merger itself.  
As a result, hedge funds do not have the opportunity to buy into a private 
company’s stock after a merger has been announced for the purpose of 
bringing an appraisal claim.  A second factor is that many private 
company participants are repeat players who are subject to reputational 
constraints.123  The risk that a party will be excluded from future 
investment opportunities both limits opportunistic behavior and reduces  
an investor’s willingness to challenge the fairness of a transaction 
through litigation.124 
 A third factor that limits appraisal litigation is the prevalence of 
contractual limitations on the right of shareholders to bring appraisal 
cases.125  These contractual limitations typically take the form of 
 
121 See, e.g., Steve Blank, When Founders Go Too Far, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.-Dec. 
2017), https://hbr.org/2017/11/when-founders-go-too-far (“In 2016 there were 3,260 
acquisitions of technology companies and only 98 tech IPOs, according to CB 
Insights”). 
122 See, e.g., Jeff Wolters, Delaware Law for Venture-Backed Companies: 
2017 Year in Review, Morris Nichols VC/PE Update, Jan. 2018. 
http://www.mnat.com/files/BylinedArticles/2018_DelawareLawforVentureBackedCom
panies2017YearinReview_January2018.pdf (“in private company mergers … every 
merger triggers appraisal rights,”). 
123 See Vladimir Atanosov, Vladimir Ivanov & Kate Litvak, Does Reputation Limit 
Opportunistic Behavior in the VC Industry? Evidence from Litigation against VCs, 67 
J. FIN. 2215 (2012) (discussing how reputational constraints reduce opportunism by 
VCs and documenting the fact that VCs involved in litigation suffer declines in future 
business opportunities). 
124 Id. 
125 There are other reasons.  For example, private company investors, particularly VC 
funds face reputational constraints – they are repeat players who are interested in being 
involved in future deals.  See Blank, supra note 121 (noting that, because of the 
increasing supply of private capital and the limited number of attractive start-ups, VC 
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shareholder agreements, which are widely used in startup companies.126  
Although few judicial decisions have determined the extent to which 
these provisions constitute enforceable limits on shareholders’ statutory 
appraisal rights, their use is evidence that, at least in the startup world, 
market participants view private ordering as an attractive tool for dealing 
with the cost and uncertainty of appraisal litigation.127  This Part 
describes the most common forms of contractual limitations on appraisal 
rights and the extent to which courts have analyzed their validity.       
 The drag-along provision is most common form of limitation on 
appraisal rights used by startups.128  Drag-along provisions require 
shareholders, in specified conditions, to vote their stock in favor of a 
merger.  Typically, the conditions required to trigger the vote are board 
approval of the merger, support for the merger by a specified percentage 
of the other shareholders, or both.  Some drag-along provisions also 
 
funds have less power and are more deferential to the interests of founders). See also 
Matthew Lynley, Very Famous VC Bill Gurley Says Startup Boardrooms Are Now Just 
Filled With *Clapping Hand Noise*, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/14/very-famous-vc-bill-gurley-says-startup-
boardrooms-are-now-just-filled-with-clapping-hand-noise/.  (observing that “What the 
venture capitalist is afraid of is losing the next big one.”). Private companies also 
provide less potential for legal fees and are therefore less likely to be attractive to 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.   
126 Shareholder agreements take a variety of forms including purchase agreements, 
financing agreements, and shareholder rights agreements – all of which this article will 
term shareholder agreements.  See Jill. E. Fisch, Private Ordering and the Role of 
Shareholder Agreements, working paper (2020) (discussing the various types of 
shareholder agreements).   
127 Concededly, some contractual provisions such as drag-along rights provide value to 
start-up participants beyond limiting appraisal. See, e.g., Robert B. Little & Joseph A. 
Orien, Issues and Best Practices in Drafting Drag-Along Provisions, HARV. L. SCH. 
FOR. ON CORP. GOV., Dec. 14, 2016, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/14/issues-and-best-practices-in-drafting-drag-
along-provisions/  (describing issues that can be addressed through an appropriately-
drafted drag-along provision).  
128 See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A Contractarian 
Rebuttal to the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 
128 (1997) (observing that “venture capital agreements often contain … drag-along 
rights,”); Steven B. Gorin, Shareholders Agreements for Closely-Held Corporations, 
2018, SA011 ALI-CLE 2629 (observing that “shareholder agreements often contain a 
‘drag-along’ right”); Joseph A. Bartlett, Ross Barrett & Michael Butler, Advanced 
Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A Documents, § 7.03[4], at 7-10 (2004) 
(describing survey results reporting that venture capital funds "always" or "often" 
demand and receive drag-along rights sixty-five percent of the time).. 
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specify conditions such as a minimum price or require that all 
shareholders receive equal consideration for the provision to be 
triggered. 
 Drag-along provisions facilitate a sale or merger of the company 
by reducing the percentage of shares required to accomplish a 
transaction.  Drag-along rights both prevent a hold-up problem by the 
minority shareholders when the majority shareholders negotiate a deal129 
and encourage the majority stockholder to adhere to the requirements 
necessary to trigger the drag-along, implicitly improving the fairness of 
the price and process for the minority shareholders.130   
 Technically drag-along provisions are a form of voting 
agreement.  As such, they fall within the scope of statutes that explicitly 
authorize shareholder voting agreements.  Significantly, drag-along 
provisions do not expressly speak to dissenting shareholders’ appraisal 
rights. Instead, drag-along provisions operate indirectly by eliminating 
the ability of a shareholder to dissent from a merger.  Because statutory 
appraisal rights are limited to dissenting shareholders,131 if a shareholder 
must vote in favor of a merger pursuant to the terms of the drag-along 
provision, the theory is that such shareholder will not be eligible for 
appraisal rights. 132  As one commentator observes, although academics 
 
129 John Agogliati III & Ross Hurwitz, Tag-Along And Drag-Along Rights: A Valuation 
Analyst's View, LAW360 (May 12, 2015), (“Drag-along provisions can prevent a 
situation where minority shareholders have the ability to block a sale of the company 
that was otherwise initiated by the controlling shareholder or a majority of the other 
shareholders.”) 
130 Corporate Finance Institute, Drag Along Rights, 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/deals/drag-along-rights/ 
131 See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 262(a) (restricting appraisal rights to any shareholder “who has 
neither voted in favor of the merger or consolidation nor consented thereto in writing”). 
132 See, e.g., Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Carrots & Sticks: How VCs Induce 
Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1331, n. 50 (2013) 
(“To the extent that common shareholders have agreed to vote their shares as directed 
by the VCs, and the shares are voted in favor of a transaction, the common shareholders 
may lose their right to appraisal, which is generally available only to shareholders who 
vote against the transaction”);  See also Lisa R. Stark, Side-Stepping Fiduciary Issues in 
Negotiating Exit Strategies for Preferred Stock Investments After Trados, Amer. Bar 
Found, 2013, (observing that drag-along provisions can be used to limit the board’s 
exposure for breach of fiduciary duty). 
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have argued that drag-along provisions therefore operate as implicit 
appraisal waivers, courts have not addressed the issue.133  
 One potential concern is that waivers of statutory rights must be 
knowing and explicit.  Whether a drag-along would therefore qualify as 
an explicit waiver of the right to seek appraisal is unclear.  Dicta from a 
2016 Delaware chancery court decision is instructive.  In Halpin v. 
Riverstone National, Inc. a controlling stockholder used its voting power 
to effectuate a merger by written consent 134  Although Riverstone had a 
shareholder agreement that contained a drag-along, because of the 
merger structure, the transaction did not involve a formal shareholder 
vote.  Accordingly, the court held that the drag-along was not triggered 
and that it need not consider whether a drag-along provision was the 
equivalent of a waiver of appraisal rights.   
 The Halpin court noted that the question of whether common 
stockholders may “ex ante contractually commit to a waiver of the 
appraisal rights provided by statute” was unresolved by prior case law.  
It observed that prior case law spoke to the question of whether preferred 
shareholders could contract out of their appraisal rights,135 but that 
“whether a common stockholder may contractually waive its statutory 
appraisal rights for consideration to be set later by a controlling 
stockholder” was a different and ‘interesting legal issue.’”136  On the 
facts before it, however, the court determined that it was unnecessary to 
resolve that question.137 In particular, the court observed that case law 
required that any waiver of the shareholders’ statutory appraisal right be 
clear and that the language of the drag-along provision “lacks the clarity 
to compel a waiver.”138  
 Shareholders can also limit appraisal rights through contractual 
provisions that designate the consideration shareholders will receive in a 
 
133 Steve Hecht, Can Drag-Along Provisions Be Used To Stifle Appraisal Rights?, 
Appraisal Rights Litigation Blog, Dec. 16, 2014, 
https://www.appraisalrightslitigation.com/2014/12/16/can-drag-along-provisions-be-
used-to-stifle-appraisal-rights-2/ (“we are not aware of any case in Delaware or New 
York that has decided whether a drag-along clause can be enforced to effectively waive 
appraisal rights on the part of the shareholder being dragged along to consent to the 
deal.”). 
134 Halpin v. Riverstone Nat'l, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 49. 
135 Id. at *16 and n.23. 
136 Id. at *27. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at *35 n. 55. 
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merger or how that consideration will be determined.  As John Coates 
has explained, these contractual provisions can take various forms such 
as “fair price charter provisions, entering into buy/sell agreements, or 
issuing redeemable stock.”139 An example of this type of provision was 
found in Ford Holdings, in which the certificate of designation for the 
preferred stock explicitly stated that the preferred stockholders would 
receive the liquidation preference plus any accrued and unpaid dividends 
in the event of a cash out merger.140  Chancellor Allen concluded that 
this contractual language determined the consideration that the 
shareholders were entitled to in the event of a merger and that the 
shareholders were “not entitled to anything additional.”141  Charter 
provisions or provisions in the certificate of designation for preferred 
stock may also provide that a merger or other transaction triggers a 
redemption right or a conversion of the preferred stock, on designated 
terms or at a designated price.142   
 A third option is an explicit waiver of appraisal rights or an 
agreement to refrain from bringing an appraisal proceeding.143   As noted 
above, the court in Halpin relied on the fact that the contractual drag-
along had not been triggered to conclude that the shareholders had not 
waived their appraisal rights.  The possibility that a transaction could be 
structured in a way that did not trigger drag-along rights or involve a 
shareholder vote highlighted the potential value of an explicit appraisal 
waiver, and following the Halpin decision, explicit waivers became more 
common, as practitioners sought to address Halpin’s conclusion that the 
existence of a drag-along provision alone might be held not to constitute 
 
139 See John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: 
Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1999) 
(observing that issuers can contract around judicial determinations of fair value by “fair 
price charter provisions, entering into buy/sell agreements, or issuing redeemable 
stock”.). 
140 In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc., Preferred Shares, 698 A.2d 973, 978 (1997). 
141 Id. 
142 See, e.g., Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, C.A. No. 5233-
VCP, at 8-9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (upholding, in an appraisal, a charter provision 
allowing company, in connection with a merger, to convert preferred shares to common 
stock). 
143 Notably, the NVCA Model Venture Capital Voting Agreement provides suggested 
separate language for drag-along provisions and explicit appraisal waivers.  See NYCA 
Model Voting Agreement (updated Jan. 2018) §3.2(e), https://nvca.org/download/5094/ 
(providing model language for appraisal waiver). 
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an explicit waiver.144  Nonetheless, those in the legal community 
expressed uncertainty over the extent to which appraisal waivers were 
valid, and, if so, whether they could be used to eliminate the appraisal 
rights of common as opposed to preferred stockholders.145   
This issue was finally addressed by the Delaware chancery court 
in the Manti case.146  Petitioners in Manti were common stockholders 
who sought appraisal following a “company sale,” in which the merger 
proceeds were to be distributed pursuant to the waterfall provision in the 
charter under which they would receive little or nothing.  Petitioners had 
signed a shareholder agreement providing that they would "refrain from 
the exercise of appraisal rights with respect to such transaction."147 
The court concluded that the appraisal waiver was clear and 
unambiguous: “No contracting party, agreeing to the quoted language, 
would consider itself free to exercise appraisal rights in light of Board 
approval of a contractually-compliant Company Sale.”148 The court 
concluded that the terms of the shareholder agreement had been met and 
further held that the company, which was a party to the shareholder 
agreement, could enforce those terms. 
Petitioners subsequently moved for reargument of the Manti 
decision, arguing that the waiver of appraisal rights was not enforceable 
because it was contrary to Delaware law.149  They argued that a waiver 
of statutory appraisal rights is invalid under the DGCL and inconsistent 
 
144 See, e.g., Robert C. Schwenkel, et al., Court Leaves Open Whether Appraisal Rights 
May Be Waived By Agreement—Halpin v. Riverstone, 19 M&A LAW. 16 (2015), 
https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/Court%20Leaves%20Open.pdf 
(observing that “Controllers seeking to enforce a waiver of appraisal 
rights through a drag-along should: include in the drag-along agreement an explicit 
acknowledgment by the minority stockholders that they waive their appraisal rights 
if the drag-along is invoked”).  
145 See, e.g., Ryan Taylor, The Implications of Halpin v. Riverstone National for 
Drafting and Exercising Drag-Along Provisions, Weil Global Private Equity Watch, 
Apr. 28, 2015, https://privateequity.weil.com/insights/the-implications-of-halpin-v-
riverstone-national-for-drafting-and-exercising-drag-along-provisions/ (“While waiting 
for the courts to ultimately rule on the validity of prospective waivers of appraisal rights 
by common stockholders, practitioners and private equity professionals should take a 
cautious approach when drafting and exercising rights under provisions that purport to 
require stockholder participation or voting in a merger”). 
146 Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 318 
147 Id. at *4. 
148 Id. at *5. 
149 Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 307 
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with public policy.  Relying on Ford Holdings, the court found that 
Delaware law permitted a waiver of statutory rights, at least on the facts 
of the case at bar where the waiver was clear and unambiguous and 
where the petitioners were sophisticated investors who were fully 
informed and represented by counsel when they signed the SA.”150  
Notably, the court considered and rejected petitioners’ claim that 
appraisal rights are a mandatory feature of Delaware law that is not 
subject to private ordering.  Instead, the court observed that “the DGCL 
does not explicitly prohibit contractual modification or waiver of 
appraisal rights, nor does it require a party to exercise its statutory 
appraisal rights.151   
Commentators have characterized Manti as “bring[ing] additional 
certainty to private equity and venture capital.”  Significantly, Manti 
both upholds the contractibility of appraisal rights under Delaware law 
and accepts the proposition that this contractual analysis applies to 
common as well as preferred stockholders.  Both the rationale and effect 
of the Manti decision are, at this point, unclear, and VC Glasscock 
explicitly limited his analysis in Manti to the circumstances of the 
case.152  Notably, the broader implications of Manti for the permissibility 
of explicit appraisal waivers depend on several factors, including the 
extent to Manti is context-specific, the extent to which the holding is 
predicated on the conclusion that statutory appraisal rights are subject to 
private ordering, and the degree to which this conclusion would apply in 
the context of a public company that sought to implement an appraisal 
waiver through a charter or bylaw provision.  This Article addresses 
those issues in Part VI below.  Before doing so, however, the Article 
considers, in more detail, the policy case for appraisal waivers.    
 
III.  The Policy Case for Appraisal Waivers 
 
 The debate over appraisal litigation focuses on how to get the 
appraisal remedy right.  As commentators have observed, appraisal 
operates to discipline both the merger price and the deal process by 
providing a mechanism by which minority shareholders can challenge 
 
150 Id. at *11.  The court noted that it “need not decide whether a waiver of appraisal 
would be upheld in other circumstances.”  Id. 
151 Id. *11. 
152 See id. at *10 (“in light of the specific facts here, I find that waiver of appraisal 
rights is permitted under Delaware law”). 
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deals that are unfair.  If the appraisal remedy is too restrictive, 
shareholder welfare will be adversely affected.  If appraisal is available, 
however, in cases in which it is unnecessary to protect investor welfare, 
then the complex task of creating and evaluation multiple valuation 
methodologies is not cost-justified.   
 One issue is determining the circumstances under which appraisal 
is warranted.  Commentators have debated the need for appraisal in 
transactions involving publicly-traded corporations – a debate that led to 
the market-out exception.153  As noted above, states have taken very 
different approaches to the scope of that exception.  Similarly, critiques 
have questioned the need for appraisal in transactions involving a robust 
merger process, particularly in the absence of a controlling stockholder 
or other type of conflict of interest transaction.  For example, Vice-
Chancellor Glasscock observes that the classic justification for appraisal 
is when minority stockholders have been squeezed out at an unfair price 
but that there is “little to recommend extending an appraisal right to 
dissenters in the case of a ‘clean’ merger.”154   
 Moreover, because of the complexity of the valuation process, a 
potential cost of allowing appraisal litigation is the potential variability 
of the outcome.  The likelihood of abusive litigation increases to the 
extent that the valuation methodology in appraisal proceedings creates 
uncertainty about the court’s determination of fair price.155  For example, 
the Delaware Supreme Court observed in Dell that “each party—
petitioners and the Company—enlisted highly paid, well-credentialed 
experts to produce DCF valuations. But their valuations landed galaxies 
apart—diverging by approximately $28 billion, or 126%.”156   
 These concerns have led to legislative responses.  Both the 
Delaware appraisal statute and the appraisal provision in the MBCA 
 
153 See Newell, supra note 24. 
154 Glasscock, supra note 18 at 10. Vice-Chancellor Glasscock defines a clean merger 
as “stock that trades freely, determination by an untainted board that the merger 
represents greater than standalone value, and exposure to a market” Id. at 9. 
155 See, e.g. id. at 29 (observing that “appraisal arbitrage is no better or worse than the 
underlying appraisal cause of action: whether that action promotes efficiency or not, the 
effect -- good or ill -- is simply magnified by the availability of arbitrage”). 
156 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 36 (Del. 
2016). 
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have been amended on multiple occasions.157  In Delaware, the 
legislature amended the appraisal statute most recently in 2016.158  The 
amendments made two changes.  First, they created a de minimis 
exemption to appraisal rights in public company mergers, barring claims 
when the number of shares seeking appraisal is less than 1% of the 
outstanding shares.159  Second, they provided an acquiror the option to 
prepay some or all of the merger consideration to the petitioner up front, 
thereby eliminating the accrual of statutory interest on the amount of the 
prepayment.160   
 Although commentators have noted that the prepayment 
provision in particular reduces the potential return that appraisal 
arbitrageurs can obtain through the payment of interest, they have 
warned that the amendments do not go far enough to reduce the risk of 
abusive litigation and noted their potential to create other problems such 
as increasing the arbitrageur’s liquidity during the pendency of the 
appraisal proceeding.161  In addition, the statute does not specify what 
happens if the prepayment amount exceeds the judicially-determined fair 
value.  Accordingly, in Panera Bread, where respondent in accordance 
with the statute prepaid the merger price and subsequently established 
that deal price exceeded fair value, the court refused to order a refund of 
the excess.162   
 The MBCA was amended most recently in 2006 to shift the focus 
of the appraisal remedy toward self-dealing in conflict of interest 
transactions.163  Specifically, the market-out exception to appraisal in 
public company mergers was eliminated in transactions involving a 
conflict of interest.164  As with other amendments to the MBCA, 
 
157 Newell, supra note 24 (describing history of Delaware appraisal statute); Robert B. 
Thompson, Appraisal and the Model Business Corporation Act, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 253, 264-66 (2011) (describing amendments to the MBCA appraisal provision). 
158 See, e.g., Onyeador, supra note 2, at 357-8 (describing and evaluating the 2016 
amendments). 
159 8 Del. C. § 262(g). 
160 8 Del. C. § 262(h). 
161 Miehl, supra note 3, at 667-8. 
162 See, e.g., In re Panera Bread Co., 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, *106 (“Here, the only 
permissible conclusion is fortunately a logical one: the General Assembly intended to 
omit a refund mechanism.”). 
163 Thompson, supra note 157 at 266 (“The 2006 changes make clear the shift of 
appraisal away from liquidity toward fiduciary-duty policing of conflict of interest”). 
164 Id.  In addition, the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy would not apply in conflict 
transactions unless there was a “cleansing action.”  Id. 
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however, states exhibit substantial variation in the degree to which they 
adopt them.  Thus, only a minority of MBCA states followed the 
MBCA’s move to eliminate the market-out in conflict of interest 
transactions.  Of the 36 states that provide a market-out exception to 
appraisal rights, only eleven limit it to non-conflict situations.165 
 Despite these efforts, there are reasons to question whether any 
state has gotten the appraisal remedy “right” and whether empirical 
studies have the capacity to answer that question.  Legislative and 
judicial reform efforts present the ongoing risk of regulatory error.  
Indeed, the degree of variation among state corporation statutes with 
respect to the structure of the appraisal remedy suggests a lack of 
consensus as to the optimal approach.  In addition, as the preceding 
discussion notes, the role of appraisal is a product of ongoing market 
developments.  The combination of the rise of hedge funds and low 
market interest rates both contributed to the growth of appraisal litigation 
as an investment strategy.  Other market developments such as the 
growth in passive investing strategies, the concentration of ownership in 
the hands of a small number of asset managers, and the increase in the 
number of large companies that are staying private may also affect the 
manner in which appraisal rights should be structured.      
 In addition, the appropriate scope of the appraisal remedy may 
vary depending on firm-specific characteristics.  To the extent that 
appraisal rights protect liquidity interests, those rights are more 
important for shareholders who hold illiquid shares. The distinction 
today does not depend entirely on public company status; rather, share 
liquidity exists along a spectrum in which the shares of some public 
companies are thinly-traded and the shares of some large private 
companies enjoy considerable liquidity.166 
 As the 2006 amendments to the MBCA recognize, the 
importance of appraisal also depends on ownership structure.  Minority 
stockholders in corporations with a controlling stockholder or a control 
group may be more vulnerable to self-dealing in connection with a 
merger.  Concerns of self-dealing increase in the context of freeze-outs 
or when majority stockholders receive different merger consideration 
than minority stockholders.  Control is not the only relevant aspect of 
 
165 Siegel, supra note 34, at 248.  
166 Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 
182 (2012) (detailing the growth of secondary markets in private company stock and 
estimating their “the total transaction volume in the billions”). 
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ownership structure.  The value of appraisal rights may also depend on 
the identity and characteristics of the shareholder base as a whole – the 
shareholders’ ability to identify and vote against suboptimal transactions, 
the shareholders’ investment horizon, and the extent to which shares are 
held by intermediaries who may face a conflict in voting on a merger.   
 Finally, the importance of appraisal rights may vary based on the 
nature of the company and the industry.167  Share price volatility may 
increase the risk of opportunistic merger timing.  Industry characteristics 
affect the likelihood of a merger and the availability of comparable 
transactions to serve as metrics of fair value.  Shareholders in new 
economy companies with substantial information asymmetries about 
future growth may need greater protection than shareholders in 
corporations with predictable cash flows. 
 Both the apparent difficulty in establishing an optimal appraisal 
remedy and the degree to which what is optimal depends on firm-
specific characteristics suggest that private ordering may be preferable to 
regulation in determining the availability of appraisal rights.  Private 
ordering allows corporations to tailor their governance structures – 
typically through charter and bylaw provisions – to meet their individual 
needs.168  Corporate law broadly supports private ordering through 
statutory provisions that authorize a substantial degree of firm-specific 
tailoring.  Common examples of private ordering include dual-class 
voting structures, classified boards of directors, forum selection 
provisions and majority voting.  Private ordering facilitates efficient 
customization through rules that vary based on firm-specific 
differences.169  Private ordering also allows innovation and 
experimentation and reduces the risk of regulatory error associated with 
mandatory regulation.170 
 
167 See, e.g. Jordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, Pills and Partisans: 
Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 692 (2012) (demonstrating 
through model that “Shareholders' and Insiders' preferences [with respect to takeover 
defenses] depend on the Target's particular characteristics, and there are instances in 
which both groups prefer the same level of defenses.”). 
168 See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2015) (defining private ordering as “the adoption of 
issuer-specific rules that are contractual in nature (as opposed to statutes, agency rules, 
or decisional law)”). 
169 See id. at 1639 (describing the advantages of private ordering). 
170 See id. (citing bylaws responding to board adoption and use of poison pills as an 
example of innovation through private ordering). 
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 As noted in Part II, private companies currently engage in 
extensive private ordering with respect to appraisal rights by including 
fair price provisions, drag-along rights and explicit appraisal waivers in 
their shareholder agreements.  These provisions enable firms that view 
the existing scope of the appraisal remedy as either too expansive or too 
uncertain to adopt greater predictability by contract.  The advantage of 
these provisions is that corporate participants can agree in advance to 
insulate a transaction from the prospect of a subsequent challenge 
through an appraisal proceeding.  This empowers a target company to 
negotiate a merger without a concern that the acquirer will lower the deal 
price so as to leave money available to pay dissenting shareholders.  It 
eliminates the need to include an appraisal-out term.  And, to the extent 
that some transactions may be deterred by the risk of appraisal litigation, 
a target with an appraisal waiver makes itself more attractive to 
prospective buyers. 
 Allowing appraisal rights to be subject to private ordering does 
not mean that all firms could or should eliminate appraisal rights 
entirely; it simply would provide corporate participants with the option 
of limiting or eliminating appraisal rights on a firm-specific basis.  
Importantly, appraisal waivers also need not be all-or-nothing provisions.   
An appraisal waiver can designate that it will only apply in certain 
conditions.  For example, the waiver might only apply if a merger 
received approval by a supermajority of the shareholders or approval by 
a majority of the minority shareholders.171  The waiver could exclude 
transactions in which management or a controlling stockholder is the 
buyer.  If corporate participants are wary that a controlling shareholder 
will receive a disproportionate share of the gains associated with a 
merger, they can structure an appraisal waiver that only applies if the 
controlling shareholder’s consideration is identical to that of the minority 
shareholders.  Similarly, to reduce the risk that VC fund will structure a 
merger to extract all of the value from a corporation – as in the Trados 
situation172 -- employee-shareholders’ appraisal waivers can be 
conditioned on their receiving a specified minimum price per share.  Or 
the waiver might only be triggered if the merger process included 
 
171 This would be akin to the majority of the minority condition necessary to obtain 
business judgment protection for a transaction involving a controlling stockholder 
under the standard set out in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).   
172  In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
37 
 
specified safeguards such as multiple bidders or some other form of 
market test. 
 In addition, appraisal waivers can be coupled with alternative 
mechanisms for addressing a given concern.  For example, rather than 
using appraisal rights to address differential treatment of shareholders, 
the corporate charter could contain a requirement that, in a merger, all 
shareholders receive equal consideration.173 A charter could establish a 
supermajority voting requirement for mergers to ensure the support of 
the minority shareholders.174  And a charter could provide that a merger 
triggered redemption rights, at a specified price, to ensure liquidity for 
shareholders in a private company.  Similarly, appraisal waivers can be 
efficiently packaged with other governance provisions.  For example, 
corporate participants might limit restrictions on transferability, 
increasing liquidity for existing shareholders, if they have the assurance 
that the potential purchasers – who are strangers to the enterprise – will 
lack the capacity to hold up a future transaction by exercising appraisal 
rights. 
 The advantages of predictability, firm-specific tailoring and 
limiting regulatory area counsel in favor of extending appraisal waivers 
to the public company context.  As in private companies, appraisal 
waivers would reduce the distortionary effect that the prospect of 
appraisal litigation might have on the terms of a merger. Appraisal 
waivers would reduce the potential for price discrimination between the 
passive investors who accept the deal price and hedge funds that litigate 
in an effort to obtain a higher premium.  And appraisal waivers would 
eliminate the potential cost of an appraisal proceeding in clean mergers. 
 As with appraisal waivers in the private company context, a 
public company appraisal waiver could be limited to specific contexts or 
require specified conditions.  For example, the waiver might apply only 
to mergers involving an arms-length negotiated transaction with an 
independent third-party acquirer and exclude transactions involving a 
 
173 See, e.g., Kirby Smith, The Agency Costs of Equal Treatment Clauses, 127 YALE 
L.J. F. 543, 547 (2017) (describing and evaluating the costs and benefits of equal 
treatment clauses). 
174 A supermajority requirement would be expected to increase the size of the premium, 
reducing the need for appraisal).  See, e.g., Audra Boone, Brian Broughman & Antonio 
J. Macias, Shareholder approval thresholds in acquisitions: Evidence from tender 
offers, 53 J. CORP. FIN. 225 (2018) (considering the extent to which a supermajority 
approval requirement may result in a higher deal premium).   
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controlling shareholder or a management group buy-out.  The waiver 
might also depend on the merger consideration exceeding a threshold 
price such as a specified premium over the pre-announcement trading 
price. 175  
 Appraisal waivers also allow a corporation to dictate, in advance, 
the appropriate procedures by which a merger is to be negotiated by 
stipulating those procedures as conditions for the application of the 
waiver. The waiver might require that the merger include specified 
process protections such as an auction, a shopping period, the use of an 
independent special committee or other indicia of fairness.  If, for 
example, an issuer believes that the standards set out in Dell warrant a 
dereference to the price reached in a deal negotiated in accordance with 
those standards, compliance with the Dell standards can be the predicate 
condition for waiver of the appraisal remedy.176  Issuers can also specify 
a valuation methodology as an alternative to the existing uncertainty 
about the methodology by which the courts determine fair value.   
 Critically, an issuer’s choice of contract terms would be 
transparent and subject to market discipline.  Shareholders can evaluate 
the effect of an appraisal waiver both on the prospect of a merger and on 
the merger price and can factor that into the price that they are willing to 
pay for the issuer’s shares.177  Prospective bidders would be able to 
determine the conditions under which an appraisal waiver would apply 
and structure the deal negotiation process accordingly.178  Moreover, 
 
175 In theory, appraisal waivers may be most appropriate in situations in which process 
of negotiating the merger has been “clean.”  See Glasscock, supra note 18 at 10.  The 
process of drafting a charter provision that identifies a clean merger process with 
sufficient clarity ex ante is nontrivial, however.   
176 See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 35 
(Del. 2017) (explaining that Dell’s sale process featured “"fair play, low barriers to 
entry, outreach to all logical buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the 
support of Mr. Dell's own votes . . . .”). 
177 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1562 (1989) (“A charter term that significantly affected risk or 
return should be noticed by the informed investor, in the same way that any other 
business factor would be noticed. . . . and we would readily observe price effects for 
significant variations from the standard form.”), 
178 Although appraisal waivers technically govern the rights of the acquirer by limiting 
the ability of target company shareholders to obtain more than the negotiated deal price, 
there are reasons to believe that the terms of deals are negotiated in the shadow of the 
availability of appraisal rights.  As a result, a target should be able to obtain more 
favorable deal terms if the acquirer need not factor in the potential cost of appraisal.  
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because the terms of any particular appraisal waiver can vary, firms and 
their shareholders would be able to evaluate the extent to which specific 
process protections are valuable to shareholders.  The variation in these 
terms would be reflected in stock price.  Merger waivers would thus, in 
the words of then-Vice Chancellor Strine, enable “the market [to] assess 
what works best without the high costs that come with the imposition of 
an unproven, invariable mandate.”179 
 
IV. Are Appraisal Waivers Legal? 
 
 The preceding part defends allowing firms to limit or eliminate 
shareholder appraisal rights through private ordering.  The courts have 
broadly recognized that corporate law imposes some limits on private 
ordering – these limits are common described as mandatory features of 
corporate law.180  Accordingly, this part considers the question of 
whether statutory appraisal rights, under existing law, are mandatory, or 
can be tailored by individual corporations.      
 
A. The Appraisal Statute Itself 
 
 Although the precise boundary between mandatory and enabling 
features of corporate law is somewhat unclear, courts have generally 
begun their analysis with the text of the statute.  The Delaware appraisal 
statute, §262 provides that a shareholder who meets the statutory 
conditions and complies with the required procedures to perfect his or 
her appraisal rights “shall be entitled to an appraisal.”  The use of the 
term shall has been viewed, by at least some courts as conveying that a 
particular statutory right is mandatory.181  In addition, section 262(c) 
 
See Miehl, supra note 3, at 669-71 (describing potential mechanisms for acquirer to 
engage in self-help to avoid “the risk of exorbitant post-closing costs”). 
179 Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also 
Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (2010). 
180 See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U.L. REV. 542, 543 (1990) (describing “mandatory corporate law” as 
corporate law rules that are not “waivable by contract among the relevant parties”). 
181 See, e.g., H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 152 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(reasoning that the requirements of section 228 (c) are mandatory because “the word 
‘shall’ is a mandatory term”); Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001 (Del. Ch. 1987) 
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includes language expressly authorizing corporations, through a charter 
provision, to extend appraisal rights to a broader range of transactions 
than those required by the statute, but contains no comparable language 
authorizing charter provisions that restrict or eliminate appraisal rights.  
The implication is that the statute’s failure to authorize appraisal waivers 
means that such waivers are not permitted. 
 This negative implication is not the only possible approach.  
Indeed, other sections of the Delaware statute contain express limitations 
on private ordering.  For example, 8 Del. C. § 102(f) prohibits fee 
shifting charter provisions in connection with internal corporate claims.  
Similarly, Section 102(b)(7) bars a charter provision that limits or 
eliminates director liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty. 
Accordingly, it is plausible to read section 262’s silence as permissive 
rather than prohibitive.  As the court observed in Jones Apparel that “for 
section 102(b)(1) to have meaning, it must not be limited to altering 
default provisions in statutory sections that contained ‘magic words’ 
permitting contrary provisions.”182   
 The Manti court followed the guidance suggested by the 
language from Jones Apparel.  Relying on the absence of an express 
statutory provision on the contractual waiver or modification of appraisal 
rights, the court observed that “the DGCL does not explicitly prohibit 
contractual modification or waiver of appraisal rights, nor does it require 
a party to exercise its statutory appraisal rights.”183  The court therefore 
concluded that the appraisal waiver in the case before it served “to 
supplement the DGCL, and is not inconsistent with, nor contrary to, the 
DGCL.184 
 Notably, the text of the Delaware statute does not distinguish 
between the appraisal rights of preferred and common stockholders. 185  
As Manti noted, Chancellor Allen held in Ford Holdings that a preferred 
stockholders could fix the fair value of their shares in the event of a 
 
(interpreting as mandatory the language of section 211 stating that a corporation “shall” 
hold an annual meeting). 
182 Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 856-60 (2008), citing Jones 
Apparel, 883 A.2d at 848. 
183 Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 307, *11 
184 Id. 
185 See also 2 DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 36.07 (2018) (“As a 
general rule, preferred stock possesses the same appraisal rights as common stock.”). 
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merger through a provision in the certificate of designation.186  This 
provision, the Manti court concluded, “effectively” waived the 
shareholders’ right to an appraisal and, as such served a precedent that 
appraisal waivers, where clear, were permitted under section 262.187  
 Concededly, Manti’s holding was narrow.  The court explained: 
“I need not decide whether a waiver of appraisal would be upheld in 
other circumstances.”188  Its analysis also differs from that of prior 
courts.  For example, in upholding the provision in Ford Holdings, 
Chancellor Allen explicitly emphasized that preferred stock is different 
and that his holding “deals only with the appraisal remedy for preferred 
stock.”189  The court specifically noted that “preferred stock is a very 
special case.”190  The court in Halpin emphasized this language in 
observing in dicta that case raised an “interesting legal issue as to 
whether a common stockholder may contractually waive its statutory 
appraisal rights for consideration to be set later by a controlling 
stockholder.”191   
 Whether subsequent courts will both follow the Manti court’s 
analysis of the statute and apply it in different contexts remains to be 
seen.  A further complication is that the Delaware courts have only 
considered the legality of appraisal waivers in the context of shareholder 
agreements involving private companies.  Delaware precedent suggests, 
albeit frequently in dicta, that shareholder agreements may be subject to 
different analysis than a charter or bylaw provision and that, in some 
cases, shareholders have broader power to waive their rights through a 
shareholder agreement. 192 Whether the case law concerning appraisal 
 
186 In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings., Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973 (Del. 
Ch.1997) 
187 Manti at *10.  Significantly, Chancellor Allen held in Ford Holdings that appraisal 
rights are a “mandatory provision[] of Delaware law”). Ford Holdings, 698 A.2d at 
976. 
188 Manti at *11. 
189 In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, 698 A.2d 973, 977 
190 Id. at 977.  See also id. (“All of the characteristics of the preferred are open for 
negotiation; that is the nature of the security.”).  Similarly, in Metromedia, the court 
upheld a contractual designation of the merger consideration to be paid to preferred 
stockholders rather than conducting its own independent valuation under the appraisal 
statute but emphasized the fact that its holding involved the rights of preferred 
stockholders.  In re Appraisal Metromedia Int'l Grp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893 (Del. Ch.2009) 
191 Halpin v. Riverstone Nat'l, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 49, *26 
192 See, e.g., Gabriel Rauterberg, The Separation of Voting and Control: The Role of 
Contract in Corporate Governance (June 2020 draft), at 3, (making this claim). 
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waivers depends on this distinction and, if so, whether that distinction 
warrants different legal analysis are beyond the scope of this Article, and 
I address them elsewhere.193 
 The language of the MBCA differs somewhat from the Delaware 
statute.  Section 13.02 provides that a shareholder “is entitled to 
appraisal rights.”   The MBCA goes further than the Delaware statute in 
authorizing corporations to supplement statutory appraisal rights – 
section 13.02(a)(5) states that a corporation may provide appraisal rights 
with respect to “any other merger, share exchange, disposition of assets 
or amendment to the articles of incorporation” and permits that 
expansion of appraisal rights to take the form of a charter provision, 
bylaw or board resolution.  Moreover, the MBCA expressly authorizes a 
charter provision that limits or eliminates appraisal rights, but only for 
preferred shareholders that have the right to vote separately on the action 
giving rise to such appraisal rights.194  The official comment to the text 
conveys the negative implication of this provision: “Chapter 13 does not 
permit the corporation to eliminate or limit the appraisal rights of 
common shares.”   
 Notably at least one state adopted the MBCA language but 
modified its treatment of appraisal waivers.195  The Maryland statute was 
 
Although courts consciously evaluate shareholder agreements through a contractual 
lens in which the waiver of statutory or even constitutional rights is permitted, the 
number of actual cases in which courts have enforced provisions in shareholder 
agreements that would not be permitted in the charter and bylaws is limited.  See Fisch, 
supra note 126 (describing case law on enforceability of shareholder agreements). 
193 See Fisch, supra note 126 (arguing that courts require corporations to use charter 
and bylaw provisions for private ordering and refuse to enforce efforts to use 
shareholder agreements to circumvent any statutory limits).  Language in the chancery 
court’s decision in Salzberg also suggests that, because the corporation is a creature of 
state law, the ability of corporate participants to arrange their rights and powers by 
private contract is limited.  See Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578, 
*42 (“The contract that gives rise to the artificial entity and confers these powers is not 
an ordinary private contract among private actors. The certificate of incorporation is a 
multi-party contract that includes the State of Delaware.”) 
194 Such a provision, if adopted through an amendment to the charter, does not apply to 
any corporate action within a year after the amendment.  MBCA § 13.02.     
195 See Ryan Stoker, Guest Post: Minority Stockholders Beware – Disappearing 
Appraisal Rights in Maryland, Appraisal Rights Litig. Blog, Feb. 19, 2019, 
https://www.appraisalrightslitigation.com/2019/02/19/guest-post-minority-
stockholders-beware-disappearing-appraisal-rights-in-maryland/ (last visited June 8, 
2020) (terming the ability of a Maryland corporation to eliminate shareholder appraisal 
rights through a charter provision “unique”). 
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amended in 2000 to provide that statutory appraisal rights do not apply if 
a corporation’s “charter provides that the holders of the stock are not 
entitled to exercise the rights of an objecting stockholder under this 
subtitle.”196  The statute thus allow private ordering with respect to the 
appraisal rights of both common and preferred stockholders (but only in 
the charter) and eliminates the delayed effective date provided by the 
MBCA for the adoption of an appraisal waiver.   
 The court in Egan v. First Opportunity Fund,197 relied on this 
provision to uphold a process in which a corporation first submitted a 
proposed charter amendment to its shareholders that eliminated appraisal 
rights and immediately thereafter asked them to approve a merger that, 
but for the charter amendment, would have triggered appraisal rights.  
Although the court noted that the charter amendment “was presented for 
the purpose of facilitating the merger transaction,”198 it found that the 
amendment was “was adopted in accordance with the literal 
requirements of the Maryland corporation statute,” and was therefore 
valid.199  Accordingly the court dismissed the petitioners’ demand for 
appraisal.200 
 The stark difference between the language of the Maryland 
statute and that of the MBCA, as well as the official comment to the 
MBCA, strongly suggest that corporate efforts to limit the appraisal 
rights of common stockholders through private ordering are not 
permitted under the MBCA.  Egan likely illustrates exactly the type of 
transaction that the MBCA was designed to prevent.   
 The extent to which Delaware courts would interpret its statute, 
which is less explicit than the MBCA is unclear.  Recent Delaware 
decisions have upheld innovative efforts at private ordering in the 
absence of express statutory authorization.201  Indeed, the Delaware 
Supreme Court recently reiterated the broadly permissive nature of the 
Delaware statute in upholding a charter provision providing exclusive 
federal court jurisdiction for claims arising under §11 of the Federal 
 
196 Md. Ann Code Corps. & Ass'ns. Art. § 3-202(c)(4). 
197 Egan v. First Opportunity Fund, Inc., 2016 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 12, Case No. 24-C-
14-008132 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City, Apr. 22, 2016), 
198 Id. at *19 
199 Id. at *20. 
200 Id. at *26. 
201 See, e.g. Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corporation, 73 A.3d 
934 (Del. Ch. 2013) (upholding forum selection bylaw despite the absence of clear 
statutory language that the topic was the appropriate subject of a bylaw). 
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Securities Act of 1933.202  In Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, the Court 
observed the Delaware statute grants corporations wide latitude in 
adopting firm-specific charter provisions that address the operations of 
the corporation and the powers of its shareholders.203  It explained that 
the Delaware statute is “broadly enabling”204 and that, because charter 
amendments require shareholder action, “Delaware's legislative policy is 
to look to the will of the stockholders in these areas.”205  
 Given the broad enabling text of section 102(b)(1), the Salzberg 
explained that the scope of permissible charter provisions was subject to 
only two constraints – an express statutory limitation or Delaware public 
policy.  Given that the Delaware statute does not directly prohibit 
appraisal waivers at least to the same degree as the MBCA, the Delaware 
courts are likely to consider public policy considerations in addition to 
the statutory text in evaluating the legality of appraisal waivers.  This 
Article turns next to those considerations.     
  
B. Public Policy Considerations 
 
As the Salzberg Court noted, even in the absence of textual 
limits, courts have repeatedly asserted that some provisions of corporate 
law are mandatory as a matter of public policy.  The precise extent to 
which public policy imposes limits on private ordering is unclear. 206  As 
the Court explained in Sterling, “A precise delimitation of the scope of 
the proviso is difficult to formulate; the limits of ‘public policy’ are ill-
defined and changing.”207   
 
202 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 2020 Del. LEXIS 100. 
203 Id. at *9-10. 
204 Id. at *14. 
205 Id. at *15, quoting Williams v.  Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996). 
206 This Article does not advocate complete freedom of contract in corporate law.  
Commentators have identified significant policy arguments in favor of mandatory rules.  
See, e.g.,  Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited 
Contractual Freedom, in RESEARCCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND 
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Mark Lowenstein & Robert 
Hillman eds., 2014) .This Article merely argues that those policy arguments should not 
be applied to preclude private ordering with respect to appraisal rights.   
207 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952). 
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Salzberg cited with approval a law review article identifying only 
three areas208 in which the courts appear impose such public policy limits 
on the otherwise enabling approach to Delaware corporate law – “cases 
concerning the rights of stockholders to periodically elect directors, to 
inspect books and records, and directors' duty of loyalty.”209   
The authors of the article, Welch and Saunders, attempted to 
discern the policy considerations motivating the cases in these areas.210  
The authors observed the right of shareholders periodically to elect 
directors is a fundamental component of corporate law, thereby 
explaining the prohibition on provisions that have the effect of 
establishing permanent directors.211  Similarly they reason that 
inspection rights are “necessary to allow stockholders-the owners of 
Delaware corporations-to monitor their fiduciaries' discharge of 
management duties.”212  Finally, although they concede that the 
directors’ duty of loyalty is widely understood to be mandatory, they 
nonetheless identify at least three ways in which corporate law offers 
directors some degree of protection from liability for breaches of the 
duty of loyalty, tempering the policy case in favor of its immutability.213  
Accordingly, the authors concluded that, as a descriptive matter, the 
scope of mandatory corporate law based on public policy considerations 
is quite limited.    
The significance of public policy considerations may be further 
reduced when private ordering takes the form of a charter provision.  A 
variety statutory provisions explicitly limit modifications to the statutory 
 
208 Another area in which the statute appears to reflect public policy limits on private 
ordering is with respect to the scope of indemnification permitted by §145(f).  See 
Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996).  Although Waltuch 
is a Second Circuit decision, Delaware commentators “resoundingly agree” that the 
scope of 145(f) is limited by public policy.  Kurt A. Mayr, II, Note, Indemnification of 
Directors and Officers: The “Double Whammy” of Mandatory Indemnification under 
Delaware Law in Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services Inc., 42 VILL. L. REV. 223, 269 
(1997). 
209 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 2020 Del. LEXIS 100 n. 55, citing Welch & Saunders, 
supra note 182, at 856-60 
210 Welch & Saunders, supra note 182, at 857-64 
211 Id. at 857.   
212 Id. at 858.  
213 Id. at 858.   
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default to the charter.214  The rationale for this appears to be twofold.  
First, a charter provision (unlike a bylaw) requires shareholder approval.  
Accordingly, as the Delaware Supreme Court explained, permitting more 
extensive private ordering in the charter is consistent with “Delaware's 
legislative policy . . . to look to the will of the stockholders in these 
areas.215  Second, charter amendments requires affirmative and joint 
action by both the board of directors and the shareholders.  Accordingly, 
neither the board nor the shareholders can act unilaterally, the board’s 
authority to adopt a charter provision is constrained by its fiduciary 
duties216 and the “the stockholders control their own destiny through 
informed voting.”217 As the Court put it “This is the highest and best 
form of corporate democracy.”218  This Article incorporates these 
considerations by proposing, in Part V, that appraisal waivers be 
permissible only if implemented through a charter provision. 
One may argue, nonetheless, that appraisal rights are different 
from other corporate governance provisions in that they have a 
distinctive role in protecting minority shareholders who disagree with the 
outcome of the democratic process.219  One possible rationale for broad 
deference to shareholder voting is the existence of a mechanism for 
dissenting shareholders.   Moreover, even the actual consent 
shareholders manifest through the voting process may be limited due to 
concerns over asymmetric information and rational apathy, particularly 
in the public corporation.220   
 
214 See, e.g., 8 Del. §102(b)(7) (requiring that director exculpation provisions be 
contained in the charter); 8 Del. §122(17) (requiring that waivers of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine be in the charter).   
215 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (explaining that §102(b)(7) 
incorporates this policy). 
216 Moreover, the standard for judicial review of the board’s actions may be heightened, 
depending on the context in which the charter provision is adopted.  See id. at 1388 
(considering the appropriate standard for review of the board’s action in approving a 
charter amendment and recommending it to the shareholders). 
217 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1381. 
218 Id. 
219 See, e.g., David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public 
Benefit Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 492-93 (2017) (observing that 
one justification for mandatory corporate law rules is that they “might protect 
vulnerable parties to the corporate contract (especially shareholders) from exploitation 
that could occur under a private-ordering regime.”). 
220 See In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, 698 A.2d 973, 977 n. 8 (“Notably the 
explanation most often pressed forward for the efficiency of mandatory terms in 
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Four considerations mitigate against the claim that these 
distinctive features compel mandatory protection of appraisal rights.  
First, as noted above, charter provisions limiting appraisal rights require 
board approval, and the directors’ action both in approving such a 
provision and recommending it to shareholders would be subject to the 
board’s fiduciary duties.  Second, as noted above, the 2016 amendments 
to the Delaware statute require that a minimum of 1% of the outstanding 
shares petition for appraisal thereby eliminating appraisal rights for the 
most disempowered shareholders.  Third, one might look to LLC law in 
which appraisal rights are entirely contractual and the statute does not 
provide any appraisal rights by default.221  Although some investors in 
LLCs may be more sophisticated than corporate shareholders, LLCs may 
be publicly traded and the legislature’s decision not to protect passive 
LLC investors automatically is indicative of its view of the importance 
of appraisal rights.222   Fourth, unlike shareholder election or inspection 
rights, appraisal rights are remedial rather than structural.  Appraisal 
rights do not play a primary role in influencing corporate operating 
decisions or ensuring director accountability for those decisions.   
Ultimately, however, the legislature may be better positioned 
than the courts to consider the relative merits of these policy 
considerations.  The legislature may also be well-positioned to consider 
appraisal waivers in light of the general statutory trend toward 
facilitating greater private ordering as well as to compare appraisal 
waivers to other corporate law features such as charter provisions 
limiting the scope of the corporate opportunity doctrine.  Consequently, 
 
corporate law is that the consent to modified terms of a corporate contract through a 
corporate election may (in the case of public corporations particularly) not really 
constitute the sort of agreement that we ought to enforce because of the existence of 
asymmetrical information and rational apathy on the part of widely disaggregated 
shareholders of public companies.”). 
221 See 6 Del. § 18-210 (1998) (recognizing contractual appraisal rights). 
222 Notably, appraisal waivers are common in both private and publicly-traded LLCs.  
See, e.g., Woodcrafters Home Products Holding, LLC, Amended and Restated Limited 
Liability Company Agreement dated Jan. 4, 2010, at 51 (privately-held) (“No Member 
shall be entitled to any appraisal rights . . . .”); Travel Centers of America L.L.C. 
Operating Agreement dated May 13, 2010, at 48 (publicly-traded) (“Shareholders are 
not entitled to dissenters’ rights of appraisal in the event of a merger, consolidation or 
conversion involving the Company, a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the 
Company or the Company’s Subsidiaries, or any other transaction or event.”). 
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in Part V, the Article calls for explicit legislation authorizing appraisal 
waivers.   
  
V. Legitimizing Appraisal Waivers 
 
 The preceding discussion suggests that, although there are 
plausible arguments for the legality and enforceability of appraisal 
waivers under current law, there is nonetheless substantial uncertainty.  
That uncertainty has likely contributed to the failure of public companies 
to adopt charter or bylaw provisions that limit or eliminate statutory 
appraisal rights.223  Widespread use of appraisal waivers in private 
company shareholder agreements provides evidence however that 
appraisal waivers are potentially valuable.  Accordingly, this Article 
argues for legislation explicitly authorizing corporations to adopt 
appraisal waivers.  For the reasons detailed below, the Article argues that 
appraisal waivers should be implemented exclusively through provisions 
in corporate charters.  
 Legislation would increase predictability as well as providing 
guidelines as to the circumstances under which such waivers will be 
enforceable.  Legislation would also facilitate the adoption of appraisal 
waivers by public companies, adoption that offers a market-based 
alternative to efforts to mediate the scope of appraisal litigation either by 
regulation or by judicial efforts to adjust the valuation process.   
 
A. Legislative Clarification 
 
 Both Delaware and the MBCA have been the subject of frequent 
amendments designed to modernize and improve the statutory structure. 
One feature that continues to evolve is the role of private ordering.  Both 
statutes have adopted an increasingly enabling approach in which 
features of corporate law that were once considered immutable are 
revisited and, in many cases, converted into default provisions.  As one 
article has observed: “It may be that the mandatory rules that exist today 
will be loosened tomorrow.”224 
 
223 See also Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to 
Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 31 (2017) (describing 
the removal by most public corporations of forum selection provisions when 
shareholders challenged their legality).   
224 Welch & Saunders, supra note 182 at 955. 
49 
 
 These statutory modifications or clarifications have responded to 
a variety of stimuli.  One trigger is demand from the business 
community.  For example, corporations faced a crisis in directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance after the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision 
in Smith v. Van Gorkam.225  The high cost and limited availability of 
insurance led to concerns that corporations would be unable to attract 
qualified directors.226  The Delaware legislature responded by adopting 
§102(b)(7) which authorized corporations to adopt charter provisions 
limiting or eliminating director personal liability for breaches of the duty 
of care.227  
 Legislatures have also reacted to changes in the business 
environment.  As Gabriel Rauterberg and Eric Talley explain, “The dot-
com era of the 1990s ushered in a wave of novel market-mediated 
corporate structures [many of which ] resulted in extended families of 
corporate affiliates with partially overlapping ownership, partially 
overlapping board membership, and partially overlapping lines of 
business.”228  These structures placed increased pressure on “the 
canonical ‘undivided-loyalty’ model of corporate opportunities.”229  As 
two high-stakes cases made clear, the model was not workable for 
corporations with overlapping dominant ownership or boards.230  The 
Delaware legislature responded in 2000 by amending the statute 
expressly to authorize waivers of the corporate opportunity doctrine.231 
 Finally, legislatures have recognized that changes are appropriate 
based on the evolution of the capital markets and the nature of share 
ownership.  The rise of institutional investors, for example, and their 
growing participation in corporate governance, led to greater efforts to 
hold directors of public companies accountable through the election 
process.  Institutional investors began to introduce proposals to formalize 
 
225 See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care 
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1989) (empirically analyzing 
the reaction in the insurance market to the court’s decision). 
226 Id. 
227 See id. at 7 (“In direct response to these concerns, the Delaware Legislature enacted 
section 102(b)(7)”) 
228 Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: 
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 
1093 (2017). 
229 Id. at 1093. 
230 Id. at 1094. 
231 8 Del. C. § 122 (7). 
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the process by which shareholders could nominate director candidates.  
The Delaware Supreme Court initially concluded that a so-called proxy 
access bylaw was beyond the limits of shareholder authority pursuant to 
section 109.232 The Delaware legislature responded a year later by 
enacting two provisions to facilitate proxy access by investors.233 
 Notably, these legislative responses reflected market demand, 
other states followed Delaware’s lead, and corporations widely adopted 
the contemplated firm-specific provisions.  Within two years of 
Delaware’s adoption of §102(b)(7), forty-one states had adopted director 
exculpation provisions.234  So, for example, state legislatures followed 
Delaware’s lead in amending their statutes to authorize private-ordering 
limitations on directors’ duty of care, and provisions limiting director 
liability in accordance with these statutes are ubiquitous in public 
companies.235  Similarly, proxy access bylaws are now “mainstream” at 
large public companies, and their adoption is increasing at smaller public 
companies as well.236  Although one might predict waivers of the 
corporate opportunity doctrine to be relatively rare, Rauterberg and 
Talley report that “hundreds of public corporations in [their] sample--and 
well over one thousand in the population--have disclosed or executed 
waivers.”237 
 Similar legislative authorization of appraisal waivers is 
appropriate.  Within Delaware, the context-specific analysis of Manti 
and the cases on which it relies do not provide sufficient clarity as to the 
extent to which appraisal waivers will be enforceable and, as a result, do 
not provide a reliable basis for structuring the terms of a merger.  In 
 
232 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 (Del. 2008) (finding 
that a proxy access bylaw was invalid). 
233 See, e.g., David Skeel, The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law, 72 BUS. 
LAW. 1 (2016).  As Skeel observes, Delaware’s adoption of the proxy access legislation 
was likely also motivated by an effort to limit federal preemption.  See id. 
234 Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 
39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160 (1990) 
235 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces 
of Derivative Suits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1786 (2004) ("It is very rare for a public 
company not to have taken advantage of this exculpation."). 
236 See Holly J. Gregory, Rebecca Grapsas & Claire Holland, The Latest on Proxy 
Access, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV., Feb. 1, 2019, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/01/the-latest-on-proxy-access/ (“Proxy access 
is now mainstream at S&P 500 companies (71%) and is nearly a majority practice 
among Russell 1000 companies (48%).”). 
237 Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 228 at 1079. 
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other states, particularly those that follow the MBCA, the statute appears 
to preclude innovation through appraisal waivers – and the extent to 
which this language would extend to related terms such as drag-along 
provisions is uncertain. Given the advantages of encouraging private 
ordering with respect to appraisal rights, the market demand for 
contractual waivers, and the prospect that firm-specific innovation will 
lead to increased efficiency, the case for statutory authorization appears 
clear.  The appropriate structure of that authorization is considered in the 
next section. 
 
B. Structuring Appraisal Waivers 
 
 As Section A explained, the first step in legitimizing appraisal 
waivers is amending corporation statutes to provide explicitly that 
shareholder appraisal rights can be modified, limited or eliminated 
through private ordering.  The second step is determining the permissible 
instrument by which to do so.  Statutory provisions vary in the 
instruments through which they authorize private ordering. As noted 
above, some statutes restrict firm-specific provisions to the corporate 
charter, as is the case with 8 Del. C. §§102(b)(7) and 122(17).  Other 
statutes allow private ordering in the charter or bylaws, through board 
resolutions, and in some cases by contracts such as shareholder 
agreements. 
 The foregoing instruments vary in terms of formality and 
transparency - the charter and bylaws are the governing documents of the 
corporation, the statute specifies the process by which they are amended, 
charter amendments must be filed with the state, and bylaw amendments, 
for public companies, must be filed with the SEC and disclosed to 
shareholders on a form 8K. 
 They also vary with respect to whether they require bilateral as 
opposed to unilateral implementation.  Corporate charters are distinctive 
in that they require both board and shareholder approval to amend.  The 
requirement of joint action reduces the potential for self-dealing or 
opportunistic behavior by either management or the shareholders.  Given 
that the board’s actions are limited by fiduciary duties, board 
acquiescence operates as a constraint against self-dealing by a 
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controlling stockholder as well.238  More broadly, joint decisionmaking 
can promote collaborative information-sharing and debate about the 
desirability of an appraisal waivers and how it should be structured.239  
 As commentators and the MBCA have observed, a substantial 
justification for the modern appraisal remedy lies in its role in protecting 
minority shareholders from abuse of control and self-dealing 
transactions.  Indeed, this concern is highlighted in the 2006 amendments 
to the MBCA.  Minority shareholders can be exploited by other 
shareholders, by management or by a board responsive to the interests of 
the majority of the shareholders.  A requirement of joint action, coupled 
with the constraint of fiduciary principles, is a powerful weapon limiting 
the potential for appraisal waivers to insulate abusive transactions.  For 
these reasons, this Article proposes that the authorizing legislation limit 
appraisal waivers to exclusively to charter provisions.   This approach is 
consistent with the court’s recognition in Williams v. Geir that corporate 
democracy is at its best when private ordering occurs by means of the 
corporate charter.240  
 Concededly, in Boilermakers, then-Chancellor Strine concluded 
that a forum selection bylaw unilaterally adopted by the board (which, 
under the corporation’s charter had the authority to amend the bylaws), 
was valid notwithstanding the absence of shareholder approval.  Strine 
emphasized the flexibility of the bylaws and the ability of shareholders 
to override board decisions with which they disagreed, either by 
amending or repealing a board-adopted bylaw or by using their election 
power to “discipline boards” that act contrary to the shareholders’ 
interests.241 I have argued elsewhere that Strine’s claim is overstated.242  
A variety of practical and legal constraints operate to give boards and 
shareholders disparate power to adopt and amend the bylaws and, as a 
 
238 Moreover, the board’s decision to adopt an appraisal waiver that worked to the 
advantage of a controlling shareholder would likely be evaluated by the courts under a 
good faith standard. 
239 See, e.g. Jill E. Fisch & Simone Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 TEX. L. REV. 
863 (2020) (explaining the value of shareholder/board collaboration in promoting 
efficient corporate decisionmaking). 
240 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996). 
241 See Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956-
957 (describing shareholders’ voting power as “a potent tool to discipline boards who 
refuse to accede to a stockholder vote”). 
242 See Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 
106 CAL. L. REV. 373 (2018). 
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result, allowing board-adopted bylaws to implement private ordering is 
problematic with respect to issues in which such private ordering 
expands board authority at the potential sacrifice of shareholder interests.  
Appraisal waivers present the additional complication in that they can 
also operate to protect self-dealing by a majority of the shareholders.  
Accordingly, unilateral shareholder action, without the additional 
protection of board approval, is equally problematic.   
 Similarly, I have argued that shareholder agreements are, in 
general, a problematic mechanism for private ordering.  Shareholder 
agreements lack the formality and transparency of traditional corporate 
governance instruments, their enforceability is likely to depend on 
context-specific factors such that they do not apply equally to all 
shareholders, and they import contractual concepts such as affirmative 
consent and consideration that are inconsistent with the structure of 
corporate law.243  I argue that the current use of shareholder agreements 
that include waivers is a product of the perception that shareholder 
agreements can be used to implement private ordering provisions that 
would otherwise be invalid, and I urge courts to reject this practice.244  
 One final point to consider is the mid-stream adoption of 
shareholder agreements.  When a corporation adopts an appraisal waiver 
before its IPO, “any potential wealth effect can be impounded into the 
stock price before public investors purchase their shares.”245  A 
legislative change formally authorizing appraisal waivers could 
potentially affect the rights of existing shareholders and the value of their 
stock.246  Should the mid-stream adoption of an appraisal waiver be 
treated as the equivalent of a recapitalization or substantive charter 
amendment under current law and provide current shareholders with an 
exit remedy such as appraisal?247   
 
243 Fisch, supra note 126 
244 Id. 
245 Romano & Sanga, supra note 223, at 32-33.  A countervailing concern is the 
possibility that governance provisions are not efficiently priced in the IPO market.  See, 
e.g., Michal Barzuza, Inefficient Tailoring: The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate 
Law, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 131, 145-51 (2018) (raising concerns about inefficient 
tailoring at the IPO stage). 
246 See, e.g., Romano & Sanga, supra note 223 at 32-33 (observing that shareholders 
lack the opportunity to avoid a negative price effect if a firm adopts a value-decreasing 
corporate governance provision mid-stream). 
247 Notably, Delaware’s Public Benefit Statute originally provided that, if a traditional 
corporation converted to a Public Benefit Corporation, dissenting shareholders had the 
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 Upon further examination, however, the reasoning behind 
providing shareholders with such protection is flawed. Legislatures 
amend corporation statutes frequently, and shareholders invest in 
corporations with the knowledge that these amendments have the 
potential to affect their rights and, indirectly the value of their 
investments.248  Accordingly, shareholders have no vested rights in the 
existing scope of their appraisal rights.  Indeed, legislation providing that 
appraisal rights are subject to private ordering would impose no greater a 
burden on shareholders’ rights than more general statutory changes to the 
scope of the appraisal remedy such as the MBCA’s restriction of the 
market-out exception to transactions not involving a controlling 
stockholder or Delaware’s potential adoption of the MBCA’s broader 
market out that does not exempt cash transactions.249  
 Indeed, when Delaware adopted the Public Benefit Corporation, 
the statute provided both that a supermajority vote of the shareholders 
was required to convert a traditional corporation into a Public Benefit 
Corporation and that dissenting shareholders were entitled to appraisal 
 
right to seek appraisal.  Noam Noked, DGCL Amended to Authorize Public Benefit 
Corporations, HARV. L. SCH. FOR. ON CORP. GOV., Aug. 15, 2013, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/15/dgcl-amended-to-authorize-public-benefit-
corporations/. In 2020, the legislature eliminated the appraisal remedy.  See An Act to 
Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General Corporation Law, House 
Bill No. 341, House of Representatives, 150th General Assembly (2020), 
https://legis.delaware.gov/json/BillDetail/GenerateHtmlDocument?legislationId=48122
&legislationTypeId=1&docTypeId=2&legislationName=HB341.  
248 See, e.g., 8 Del. § 394 (reserving to the legislature the right to amend the statute and 
providing that such amendments shall be part of the charter of every corporation so 
long as they do not take away a remedy or liability that has “been previously incurred”).  
Such reservation clauses are a standard provision in corporation statutes.  Nelson 
Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues and 
Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C.L. REV. 687, 724-30 (1998).  As commentators have 
observed, these provisions overcome the result in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), but whether the reserved power can be used by private 
parties to alter the terms of an existing charter is a different question about which some 
commentators disagree.  See id. at 992 (“For almost a century and a half, there has been 
a split among the highest courts of various states over the question whether the reserved 
power does or does not sustain a corporation's utilization of permissive post-
incorporation legislation in altering the rights of shareholders.”).   
249 See generally id. (describing extensive statutory changes to shareholders’ appraisal 
rights). 
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rights.250  In 2020, the legislature voted to remove both requirements.251  
The legislation imposes a more significant limitation on the appraisal 
rights of existing shareholders of Delaware corporations who no longer 
have the right to be cashed out at fair value upon conversation to a 
corporation that has the legal right to pursue stakeholder or societal 
interests even at the expense of shareholder value.252    
 
Conclusion 
  
The appropriate scope of the appraisal remedy continues to elude 
courts, commentators, and legislatures, resulting in a body of legal 
doctrine that is inconsistent and unpredictable.  Private ordering offers an 
alternative to regulatory reform.  Private corporations are adopting a 
variety of contractual tools to limit or eliminate appraisal rights despite 
the limited judicial guidance as to whether those provisions are 
enforceable.  Extension of these tools to public corporations offers 
similar potential benefits and has the added advantage of addressing 
concerns about appraisal arbitrage. 
Although there are plausible arguments that appraisal waivers are 
legal under current Delaware law, the law is unclear.  The MBCA 
expressly prohibits appraisal waivers with respect to common 
stockholders.  This Article argues that appraisal waivers are potentially 
valuable tools of private ordering, and the state corporation statutes 
should be amended to authorize their inclusion in corporate charters.  
Such a move would facilitate experimentation and innovation and 
develop new evidence on the value of the appraisal remedy.    
  
 
250 Noked, supra note 247.   
251 Allison L. Land & Edward B. Micheletti. Delaware Corporate Law Amendments 
Address Emergency Powers, Public Benefit Corporations and Other Matters, Skadden 
Arps Client Memorandum, June 25, 2020, 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/06/delaware-corporate-law-
amendments 
252 See, e.g., Lide E. Paterno, Irresponsible Corporate-Responsibility Rules, 77 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 499, 520 (2016) (“benefit-corporation statutes were thought to free managers 
from the perceived constraints of traditional corporate law's shareholder value 
maximization norm so that the corporations could integrate other stakeholders' 
interests”). 
